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The Chilling Effect and the Problem
of Private Action
Monica Youn

66 Vand. L. Rev. 1473 (2013)

A First Amendment chilling effect occurs when a
governmental action creates a consequence that deters an individual
from exercising expressive rights. But in some cases, the chilling
effect does not stem directly from the governmental action, but
instead from intervening private actions. For example, the
mandatory disclosure of campaign contributions may "chill"
contributors,due to the potential threat of retaliatoryacts by private
actors, such as criticism, protests, boycotts, threats, or violence. Is
there a point at which the chilling effect is attributable to that
private reaction, rather than to the challenged governmental action?
And should we distinguish between chilling effects resulting from
illegal and legal private reactions?
I argue that the answer to both of these questions is yes. We
should distinguish among three categories of chilling effects:
governmental chill, illegal private chill, and legal private chill. I
outline a new framework for the analysis of mandatory disclosure
laws and other potentialprivate chill scenarios.
The category of governmental chill is defined by whether the
government has violated a constitutional rule as embodied in
substantive doctrine. For example, the government may have
engaged in invidious discrimination, it may have promulgated a
vague or overbroad law, or it may have created a burden on
protected rights that was not justified by countervailing state
interests. Both negative-rights and positive-rights accounts of free
expression provide a mandate for judicial intervention in these
cases.
By contrast, in illegal and legal private chill cases, the
government has not violated any constitutional rule, but a chilling
effect has still arisen as a result of specific, feared private actions.
Instead of a negative- or a positive-rights claim, such cases are
better conceptualized as requests for accommodation-in other
words, requests that the court intervene to facilitate the exercise of
protected rights, even at the expense of the legal prerogatives of other
private parties. Such an accommodation approach, derived from

equitable models, provides a mandate for judicial intervention in
private chill cases involving illegal private reactions, but not in
private chill cases involving legal private reactions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider two cases. In Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a state law
required newspapers who had published an editorial criticizing a
political candidate to offer that candidate a "right of reply."' A
unanimous Supreme Court invalidated the law, reasoning that the
"right of reply" requirement might deter editors from publishing
critical editorials. 2 By comparison, in the recent case Doe v. Reed, a
public records law required the disclosure of ballot-initiative-petition
signatories, and opponents of a particularly controversial initiative
announced plans to identify the signatories publicly. 3 The signatories
argued that the disclosure requirement put them at risk of private
harassment and retaliation, and that this risk deterred them from
engaging in political activities.4
Both cases involve a First Amendment chilling effect, 5 which
occurs when a governmental action has the indirect effect of deterring
a speaker from exercising her First Amendment rights.6 A given law
may lead to a particular consequence for an expressive act, such as the
418 U.S. 241, 244 (1974).
1.
2.
Id. at 257.
130 S. Ct. 2811, 2813 (2010).
3.
4.
Id.
5.
Because my argument is predicated upon First Amendment-specific normative
arguments, this paper does not directly discuss alleged chilling effects on non-First Amendment
rights.

6.

See Frederick Schauer, Fear,Risk and the FirstAmendment: Unraveling the Chilling

Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1978); see also Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling
Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1649-50 (2013); Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 268 (1985); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal
Procedure,82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 142 (1997); Note, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 808, 832-40 (1969).
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threat of criminal or civil sanctions, loss of state benefits, loss of
privacy, or some other burden or penalty. Fear of that consequence
may, in turn, deter the speaker from exercising her expressive rights.
But Doe features an additional twist on the chilling effect-an
element of private action. A speaker may refrain from speaking
because she fears a private party's reaction: criticism, harassment,
protests, boycotts, employment retaliation, or violent retribution.
Ordinarily, of course, we do not consider such private reactions to
raise First Amendment issues. We accept, as a general proposition,
that speech has consequences.
But what happens when a governmental action plays a role in
enabling such private reactions; that is, where a chilling effect
involves both governmental and private action? The problem of
private action takes a unique form in chilling effect cases.7 Since a
chilling effect is a fear of future consequences, such feared
consequences include potential private reactions. In most areas of
constitutional law, such private reactions do not affect the
constitutionality of a governmental action.8 Chilling effect doctrine
creates an exception: it expands the category of constitutionally
cognizable injuries to encompass claims of deterrence, whether that
deterrence results from governmental or private actions, from legal or
illegal retaliation.
For example, courts have long recognized that the mandatory
disclosure of political activities will have some chilling effect on
political participation, in part due to the ever-present threat of private
reactions, such as harassment or retaliation.9 Courts take such
consequences of private reactions into account when gauging a law's
overall burden on protected rights.10 Under standard balancing
analysis, a court then assesses whether sufficiently important and
adequately tailored state interests justify such a burden.
7.
As I argue infra note 108, the problem of private action in chilling effect cases presents
a problem that is conceptually distinct from the more familiar private-versus-public distinction
in state-action doctrine.
8.
See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755 (2005); Deshaney v.
Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) ("[Nlothing in the language of the Due Process
Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors."); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1543
(6th ed. 2009); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique,88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2278 (1990); Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 193 (2004). But see

Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (2006)
(arguing that, in some cases, the state is constitutionally required to take affirmative steps to
prevent private misconduct).
9.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam).

10.

See id.
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But even where a law is appropriately balanced and otherwise
constitutionally sufficient, a chilling effect may still arise from
specific, serious private reactions. For example, in the disclosure
context, political activity on a hot button social issue might spark
private reactions far more extreme than those a court's balancing
analysis would ordinarily anticipate, including organized protest and
boycotts, or even illegal activity such as threats or violence. Should
such extreme private reactions and their resulting chilling effects
have the effect of invalidating an otherwise constitutional law? Is
there some point at which the chilling effect is attributable to the
private action rather than to the enabling governmental action? And
is there reason to distinguish between severe chilling effects resulting
from legal versus illegal private reactions?
Current doctrine and scholarship have paid little attention to
these questions. Where a governmental action in some way enables a
private reaction to speech, we lack a theory to explain when such a
private reaction creates a First Amendment chilling effect."
This Article argues that in a small but significant subset of
cases-"private chill" cases-courts should consider the source of chill
to be private action, rather than governmental action, even though
state action is present. The Article further explains that in such
private chill cases the distinction between chilling effects arising from
private, legal reactions and private, illegal reactions becomes salient.
It outlines a framework for analyzing and resolving private chill cases
by focusing on three foundational questions: How can we define the
dividing line between such private chill cases and governmental chill
cases? Why does the distinction between private chill and
governmental chill matter, in terms of a mandate for judicial
intervention? And what doctrinal consequences flow from this
distinction?
First, this Article argues that chilling effect doctrine should
distinguish between governmental and private chill cases. The
distinction does not turn on the mere presence or absence of
potentially chilling private action, nor on simple causation. Some

11. Thus far, private chill cases have arisen in challenges to mandatory disclosure laws, but
the potential application of this category is much broader. New technologies have made an
unprecedented volume of speech and information both easily accessible and practically indelible.
At the same time, governmental involvement in communications architecture is inevitable and
ubiquitous. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1468
(2000); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491 (2006). Already,
increased technological interconnectivity has caused such reactions to be swifter and more farreaching than in previous eras, and resulting chilling effects are correspondingly more severe.
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element of private action will be present in a wide range of chilling
effect situations. Instead, the distinction hinges on what theorists,
such as Matthew Adler and Michael Dorf, have called the "ruleinvalidity" of the government's action; that is, whether the
government has trespassed a constitutional norm, as embodied in
substantive doctrine.' 2 For example, the government may have
engaged in invidious discrimination, promulgated a vague or
overbroad regulation, or created a burden on protected rights that was
not justified by the interests it sought to advance. In such instances,
the government has violated a First Amendment "rule," and the
chilling effect is properly attributable to this violation.
By contrast, this Article defines the category of private chill to
comprise cases in which the government has not trespassed
constitutional norms-that is, no governmental chill is present-yet
some governmental action has enabled private action, the threat of
which has chilled a speaker's expressive or associational rights.
Doe exemplifies the difference between governmental chill and
private chill in situations where both governmental action and private
action contribute to a chilling effect. In Doe, the Washington Public
Records Act ("PRA")-a state law analogue to the Freedom of
Information Act-required the names and addresses of ballotinitiative-petition signatories to be available as a matter of public
record.' 3 Advocacy groups requested these records for petition R-71,
which had sought to overturn a law granting domestic partnership
benefits to same-sex couples.14 The advocacy groups announced their
intention to post signatory information on the Internet in searchable
format.15 In other states, contributors to anti-same-sex-marriage
initiatives, such as California's Proposition 8, had been subjected to
retribution by private parties, including criticism, harassment,

12. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1166 & n.159 (2003); Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against
Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998);
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238
(1994); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 369-70 (1998); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and ThirdParty Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1364 (2000) (offering a partial critique of Adler's "rights
against rules" formulation but acknowledging that the formulation accounts for a wide range of
constitutional doctrine).
13. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2816 (2010).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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threats, loss of private employment, consumer boycotts, and even
violence. 16
Doe is especially relevant because the Court considered the
effects of private action at two separate phases of the analysis: at the
facial challenge stage and at the as-applied stage, which corresponded
to the governmental chill and private chill inquiry, respectively.17 In
the facial challenge, which analyzed the petition-signatory disclosure
requirements generally, the Court accepted that any disclosure law
may expose speakers to private harassment or retaliation, potentially
chilling political participation.1 8 Despite this acknowledged chilling
effect, an eight-to-one majority dismissed the facial challenge under
standard balancing analysis, holding that the state's interests in
transparency and electoral integrity justified the burdens of disclosing
petition signatories.19 In other words, since the PRA was appropriately
balanced and was not otherwise constitutionally objectionable, 20 the
government had violated no constitutional norm in promulgating or
enforcing it. Thus, to apply the distinction advanced in this Article,
there was no governmental chill.
But Doe also presented a private chill issue at the as-applied
stage, where the Court considered whether a specific and potentially
serious threat of retribution from private parties created an
unconstitutional chilling effect. 21 Plaintiffs sought a "harassment
exemption" to disclosure laws, which would apply if they could
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of
[personal information] will subject [them] to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." 22
Remarkably, although the as-applied challenge was not yet before the
Court, the Justices filed a total of seven opinions to register their
disparate views regarding its proper disposition. 23 The strong majority
16. Notice of Motion and Motion to Reconsider Orders Granting Washington Families
Standing Together and Washington Coalition for Open Government Permission to Intervene,
Doe, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 3:09-CV-05456-BHS), 2010 WL 4635816.
17. As I will explain, the governmental chill/private chill inquiry will often, but not always,
correspond to the faciallas-applied challenge phases of constitutional litigation. See infra note
128 and accompanying text. The discrepancy results because the term "as-applied challenge"
encompasses several different forms of challenge. See infra note 129.
18. 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976)).
19. Id. at 2819.
20. That is, the PRA did not discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint, was not
vague or overbroad, and did not otherwise violate any constitutional norm.
21. 130 S. Ct. at 2822.
22. Id. at 2823 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
23. The Court did not decide the as-applied challenge because the factual record was
undeveloped. Id. at 2821. That six Justices were motivated to author separate opinions regarding
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that had dismissed the facial challenge splintered when considering
how to weigh the state's interests in transparency against the
potential chilling effect of private harassment. 24 The Court lacked a
framework for analyzing claims of private chill.
Second, this Article argues that the distinction between
governmental chill and private chill is salient. In governmental chill
cases, First Amendment theory provides a clear mandate for judicial
intervention: chilling effect doctrine performs an important negative
function by preventing the state from trespassing constitutional
boundaries. Moreover, the chilling effect doctrine is prophylactic; it
assumes that overprotecting speech will generally do less harm than
underprotecting speech. 25 In governmental chill cases, giving the
benefit of the doubt to the speaker, rather than to the state,
presumably advances positive First Amendment values such as public
discourse, democratic deliberation, and individual autonomy.
But the mandate for judicial intervention in private chill cases
is much less clear. First, judicial intervention does not protect against
state constitutional trespasses since, by definition, no constitutional
rule has been violated. Moreover, in private chill cases, one cannot
safely assume that overprotecting a plaintiffs First Amendment
interests will enhance public discourse or other First Amendment
values. Instead, overprotection may come at the expense of a third
an as-applied question that was not yet before the Court might reflect a recognition that, with a
raft of challenges to campaign-finance disclosure requirements making their way up through the
lower courts, a workable constitutional standard is long overdue. See, e.g., Minn. Citizens
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012); Nat'l Org. for Marriage v.
Cruz-Bustillo, 477 F. App'x 584 (11th Cir. 2012); The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC,
681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012); Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011);
Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010); Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle,
624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010); Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth,
556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009); Van Hollen v. FEC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69, (D.D.C. 2012); Hatchett v.
Barland, 816 F. Supp. 2d 583 (E.D. Wis. 2011); Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 849
F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.W. Va. 2011); Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D.
Cal. 2009).
24. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2822, 2825 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
On remand, the district court dismissed the as-applied challenge, finding little evidence of
harassment in the instant case. Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
Multiple commentators have analyzed Doe v. Reed and its disclosure policy using a balancing
approach. Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A

Qualified Defense of Campaign FinanceDisclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557
(2011); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, DisclosuresAbout Disclosure,44 IND. L. REV. 255 (2010). This paper
takes no position on the optimal level or degree of mandatory disclosure.

25.

Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First

Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 569-70 (1991); Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1656; Schauer,
supra note 6, at 705.
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party's responsive speech or other legal activities. For example, the
grant of a harassment exemption to signatories of controversial
petitions may indeed shield those individuals from harassment, but at
the cost of depriving journalists, activists, and members of the public
of valuable information, discussion, and debate. Structuring a
presumption to favor a plaintiffs assertion of a chilling effect claim is
normatively problematic where speech values exist "on both sides of
the equation," as in private chill cases. 26 Moreover, in private chill
cases, a court's intervention to prevent a chilling effect may function
as the equivalent of an injunction against private actors, forbidding
them from engaging in potentially chilling behavior. For a court to
intervene in a private chill case to prevent legal behavior by third
parties raises concerns about separation of powers and judicial
unilateralism that are not present in governmental chill cases.
Third, this Article argues that rather than assessing private
chill claims under the First Amendment chilling effect framework, we
should understand such claims to be requests for accommodation. In
other words, private chill plaintiffs should be understood as
demanding the exercise of a court's equitable powers to accommodate
their First Amendment rights, even at the expense of the preexisting
prerogatives of a private party. Accordingly, this Article suggests that
an accommodation framework should govern the analysis of private
chill cases. Under this approach, which is derived from equitable
models, the court's intervention is directed to protecting speakers from
irreparable injury arising from illegal private actions rather than
protecting speakers against a chilling effect.
This Article outlines a new framework for the First
Amendment analysis of mandatory disclosure requirements and other
private-action scenarios. The approach would first ask whether the
chilling effect arises from a governmental violation of a constitutional
rule. If so, then both negative and positive accounts of expressive
rights provide a clear mandate for judicial intervention. If, on the
other hand, the chilling effect arises from private action rather than
from a governmental rule violation, then the distinction between legal
and illegal sources of private chill becomes salient. The
accommodation approach provides a mandate for judicial intervention
in cases where a chilling effect arises from private, illegal activity.
However, neither rights-based models nor the accommodation model
appear to provide a mandate for judicial intervention where a chilling
26. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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effect arises from private, legal activity, rather than from a
governmental rule violation or from private, illegal retribution.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II sets out the doctrinal
and historical foundations of the First Amendment chilling effect
doctrine. Part III describes the expansion of chilling effect doctrine to
encompass private chill claims and provides working definitions for
the categories of governmental chill and private chill. Part IV
examines the normative mandate for judicial intervention under
traditional chilling effect doctrine and criticizes its application to
private chill claims. Part V models an accommodation approach that
provides an alternative judicial mandate for intervention in private
chill cases and explains the application of this approach to Doe v. Reed
and other private chill controversies.

II. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS
The "ubiquitous and slippery"27 chilling effect is one of the most
pervasive concepts in First Amendment law, but also one of the most
poorly understood. 28 This Part provides a working definition of the
chilling effect concept and offers a historical sketch of its origins and
development.
A. Defining Chilling Effect
A chilling effect occurs where one is deterred from undertaking
a certain action X as a result of some possible consequence Y
Additionally, a chilling effect is an indirect effect: it occurs when the
deterrence does not stem from the direct restriction, but as an indirect
consequence of the restriction's application. 29 One would not say that
by banning a particular film a state censor has chilled the filmmaker's
ability to show it; instead, the censor has simply prevented the
screening, and the concept of chill adds nothing to the analysis. 30 As a
counterexample, in Davis v. FEC, the Court invalidated a law
providing that if a political candidate spent more than a threshold
amount of her own funds on her campaign, her opponent's
27.

Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 256 n.2 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

28. See Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 482 (1985); Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13, 14-15 (2011); Solove, supra note 6, at 154-55; Geoffrey R.

Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century, 37
PEPP. L. REV. 273, 277 (2009).
29. See Solove, supra note 6, at 142.
30. Schauer, supra note 6, at 692.
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contribution limits would be trebled.3 ' Although the law did not
directly prevent the candidate from spending above the threshold, the
Court reasoned that triggering a benefit to the opponent at the
spending threshold created a substantial deterrent-in other words, a
chilling effect-on such spending. 32
Thus, we arrive at a basic definition: "a chilling effect occurs
when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment are deterred from so doing by governmental regulation
not specifically directed at that protected activity."33
But this definition does not purport to tell us when and why
courts deem a chilling effect to impose an insupportable burden on
First Amendment rights. After all, to say that all governmental
actions create a chilling effect is no more than to say that all actions
have unintended consequences. 34 For example, the post office raising
the price of stamps may have a deterrent effect on my ability to write
a letter to my senator, but few would argue that such a chilling effect
would invalidate the price hike. As the Supreme Court has remarked,
"[t]he existence of a 'chilling effect,' even in the area of First
Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in
and of itself, for prohibiting state action." 35
Defining when, why, and how a chilling effect is
constitutionally unacceptable is a central challenge for First
as multiple commentators have
Amendment jurisprudence,
recognized. 36 Although dozens of Supreme Court cases have used
chilling effect-based reasoning, few scholars in recent decades have

31.

554 U.S. 724, 729 (2008).

32. Id. at 738.
33. Schauer, supra note 6, at 693; see also Solove, supra note 6, at 142; Stone, supra note
28, at 277. In a forthcoming article, Leslie Kendrick argues that, in addition to the deterrent
effect, First Amendment chilling effect cases all share a common thread: "risks imposed by legal
uncertainty." Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1655. Although I certainly agree that many, if not most,
chilling effect cases are concerned with minimizing the deterrent effects of uncertainty, I
disagree with Professor Kendrick's analysis to the extent that she suggests that all chilling effect
cases fall into the uncertainty category. For example, in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958),
the Court invalidated a state law imposing a loyalty oath requirement upon a veteran's receipt of
a tax exemption. There was nothing uncertain about the operation of the chilling effect in
Speiser-the law simply deterred individuals from membership in certain associations by
imposing a cost: the loss of a governmental benefit. Thus, chilling effect doctrine takes account of
deterrent effects beyond simple uncertainty.
34. Schauer, supra note 6, at 692.
35. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971).
36. Schauer, supra note 6, at 700; Solove, supra note 6, at 154.
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attempted to pin down the scope and significance of chilling effect
doctrine.37
One reason why the so-called chilling effect doctrine resists
ready explanation is that the chilling effect concept does not delineate
a discrete, freestanding doctrinal category. Instead, chilling effectbased reasoning is the common denominator among a number of
procedural, categorical, and substantive doctrines in First Amendment
case law. Often, chilling effect-based reasoning manifests itself as a
constitutionally mandated exception to a general doctrinal rule.
For example, Article III "case or controversy" requirements
generally require that a plaintiff demonstrate concrete and
particularized injury in order to establish standing.38 But by
recognizing bare deterrence-fear of some future consequence-as a
potential First Amendment injury, chilling effect doctrine opens the
door to relatively attenuated or inchoate claims. Courts have used
chilling effect reasoning to invalidate laws even where giving credence
to such claims has involved courts in unavoidably subjective and
contingent speculation about future effects. 39 Similarly, general
principles of standing bar a plaintiff from raising another's rights in
court. 40 However, under the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, a
plaintiff can bring a facial challenge to vague or substantially
overbroad laws that create a chilling effect on protected speech even if
she fails to demonstrate that her own speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection.41
Moving from the procedural to the substantive, courts are
relatively tolerant of a certain degree of imprecision in legislative line

37. The seminal work is Frederick Schauer's 1978 article Fear, Risk and the First
Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect. See Schauer, supra note 6. Subsequent efforts at a
comprehensive overview of chilling effect doctrine have been sparse, and most commentators
have followed Schauer's formulation. See Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1649; Solove, supra note 6,
at 142. I discuss Schauer's account in more depth, infra,notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
39. For example, Justice White, dissenting in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), criticized the majority's unsupported assumption that current libel rules had a chilling
effect upon freedom of the press: "To me, it is quite incredible to suggest that threats of libel
suits from private citizens are causing the press to refrain from publishing the truth." Id. at 390
(White, J., dissenting). Similarly, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972), criticized overbreadth doctrine for resting on "some insubstantial or imagined
potential for occasional and isolated applications that go beyond constitutional bounds." Id. at
531 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Kendrick, supra 6, at 1661; Schauer, supra note 6, at 730.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). See generally Note, Standing to
Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
41. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972). See generally STONE, supra note 8, at 1112-18.
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drawing outside the First Amendment context. In non-First
Amendment cases, courts will normally accept some overdeterrence as
the inevitable result of lawmaking. 42 But in the First Amendment
context, courts consider such uncertainty to be particularly
problematic, as what is being overdeterred might also be
constitutionally protected. Thus, where such categories as libel,
incitement, and obscenity are excluded from First Amendment
protection or are accorded a lesser degree of protection, courts have
used chilling effect-based reasoning to insist that such categorical
distinctions be bounded by bright lines in order to prevent spillover
effects on protected speech. 43
Moreover, as a general rule, courts are relatively deferential to
laws that incidentally burden the exercise of First Amendment rights
rather than regulate speech based on its communicative content. 44
One is not generally entitled to an exemption from an otherwise valid
law merely because one can demonstrate such an incidental burden. 45
For example, where park regulations prohibit sleeping in public parks,
one cannot override these regulations by arguing that such sleeping is
an expressive part of a political demonstration. 46 But under chilling
effect doctrine, courts have taken the unusual step of granting
exemptions to otherwise valid laws where plaintiffs have
42. Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1661; Schauer, supranote 6, at 730.
43. Schauer, supra note 6, at 687.
44. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994 (2010) ("Where the
[State] does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from
regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." (quoting R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992))); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)
(holding that freedom of the press does not exempt journalists from generally applicable laws);
see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-94 (2d ed. 1988);

Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulation of Speech and Free Speech
Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 930 (1993); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental
Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1996); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 54-57 (1987).
45. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (refusing to grant
constitutionally required religious exemption to a "neutral law of general applicability"); see also
William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society, and Speech-Based Claims for Religious
Exemptions from Neutral Laws of GeneralApplicability, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1937, 1950 (2011);
Stone, supra note 44, at 63.
To use a well-known example, where a generally applicable statute prohibits the
destruction of draft cards, a defendant cannot escape prosecution by arguing that burning a draft
card was essential to his exercise of First Amendment rights. Indeed, as the draft card example
demonstrates, courts will uphold regulations that not only incidentally burden rights, but
entirely prohibit their exercise with respect to some category of expression-i.e., if draft card
burning is prohibited, then a protesters' ability to burn a draft card in protest is not merely
"burdened," it is entirely foreclosed. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968).
46. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984).
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demonstrated a severe chilling effect on expressive or associational
rights.47 Relatedly, under the state-action doctrine, the actions of a
private party generally will not result in a First Amendment violation,
even where there is some level of state involvement in a regulatory
scheme.48 But under chilling effect doctrine, the problem of private
action in Doe and other cases raises the possibility that reactions by
private actors could result in the invalidation of an otherwise valid
law.49
As illustrated by the examples above, chilling effect doctrine is
somewhat of an uncomfortable fit in constitutional jurisprudence, and
the courts' extension of chilling effect-based reasoning has been
marked by periodic and severe withdrawals.50 The logic of deterrence
alone cannot explain the doctrinal path of the chilling effect concept;
an understanding of history is indispensable.
B. A Brief History
The Court's adoption of the chilling effect concept's expansive
logic has been hesitant and partial, driven by perceived necessity and
animated by a perpetual undercurrent of governmental distrust. In
the following sections, I will briefly relate how the chilling effect
concept first arose as a means to counter invidious state efforts to
suppress disfavored groups and then expanded to encompass
governmental actions that, although lacking any element of animus,
imposed unwarranted deterrent burdens on the exercise of expressive
and associational rights.
1. The Origins of First Amendment Chilling Effect Theory
Like so much of modern free speech jurisprudence, the chilling
effect theory first began to gain traction as a First Amendment
concept in the mid-twentieth century. During this period, the courts

47. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); see also
Geoffrey P. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command
of the FirstAmendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583.
48. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (holding that
there was no state action where a private association imposed sanctions against an employee of a
public university that was a member of that association); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973) (holding that the refusal of state-licensed broadcasters to accept editorial
advertisements did not violate the First Amendment).
49. For a further clarification of the relationship between private action in chilling effect
cases and standard state-action doctrine, see infra note 108.
50. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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had begun to respond to governmental efforts at censorship by
creating increasingly robust First Amendment protections against
direct state suppression of speech.51 At the same time, state and
federal governments felt increasing urgency to quash ideas and groups
they deemed subversive, especially those deemed sympathetic to
communism or the civil rights movement. 52
Thus, government officials sought recourse in more subtle
methods of suppression, including the loss of government employment
or other benefits as well as the "spotlight of pitiless publicity"
employed in governmental blacklists and investigations. 5 3 Such
indirect methods were thought to suppress subversive ideas and
activity while evading the strictures of the First Amendment. Much of
early chilling effect doctrine developed as courts attempted to protect
the communist movement and civil rights activists from such
oppressive tactics.
Were these cases to arise today, a court could turn to an array
of First Amendment tests and standards to strike down such indirect
efforts at suppression. 54 But at the time, none of these doctrines had
been fully articulated in the constitutional case law.
Instead, the Court turned to the chilling effect concept as a
kind of "protodoctrine": an early instantiation of the overarching
principle that "[w]hat the First Amendment precludes the government
from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from
accomplishing indirectly."55 As such, the First Amendment chilling
effect concept functioned much as the court's equity jurisdiction had
functioned in a previous era: to alleviate unjust results stemming from
the application of otherwise valid laws.5 6

51. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 396 (2004).
52. Id. at 312.
53. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 751381, at 2 (1937) ("[T]he spotlight of pitiless publicity [can] serve as a deterrent to the spread of
pernicious propaganda.")).
54. For example, modern First Amendment doctrine creates a presumption against
regulations that discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint. Additionally, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions prevents the government from conditioning the receipt of a
governmental benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutionally protected right. See, e.g.,
Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1506 (1989).
55. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 77-78 (1990).
56. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 932 (1987); see also OWEN W. FIss &
DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS, at iv (2d ed. 2001); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1303 (1976).
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The flexibility provided by the chilling effect concept allowed
the Court to address the ever-changing tactics of indirect suppression
that federal and state officials developed.57 For example, one
harassing tactic employed by state officials was to enmesh targeted
groups in legal proceedings, forcing them to defend themselves against
meritless prosecutions and litigation. In the classic case of
Dombrowski v. Pfister,5 8 plaintiffs brought suit under the Civil Rights
Act against state officials who were prosecuting or threatening to
prosecute them under state subversion statutes that had already been
ruled unconstitutional in the federal courts.59 The Supreme Court
invoked its equitable powers to hold that, under such circumstances,
the chilling effect upon plaintiffs' First Amendment activities was
sufficient to constitute irreparable injury, warranting injunctive relief.
Courts were at first disturbingly deferential to such
suppressive tactics.60 As the excesses of McCarthyism became more
pervasive, however, the federal judiciary slowly began to change
course, holding that the use of seemingly neutral tools would not
immunize legislative acts from judicial review if such tools were used
57. See Leslie Kendrick, Disclosure and Its Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575, 576 (2012);
Adam Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291,
1341 (2004). See generally Burt Neuborne, The GravitationalPull of Race on the Warren Court,
2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59.
58. 380 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) (reversing dismissal
on abstention grounds of request for declaratory judgment that the state statute was facially
unconstitutional, even though injunctive relief was not warranted). Dombrowski's effect on
preexisting abstention doctrine, and the extent to which its holding was narrowed by Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), has been the subject of considerable scholarly discussion. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 826-27 (5th ed. 2007). See generally Owen M. Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977) (arguing that Dombrowski heralded a new era in which
the federal courts would be "the primary guardian of constitutional rights"); Douglas Laycock,
Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
636 (1979) (arguing that Dombrowski contracted, rather than expanded, the injunctive powers of
federal courts).
59. As the Court noted, under the pretext of criminal investigation, state officials had
already subjected the plaintiffs to extensive harassment. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487 n.4:
At gunpoint their homes and offices were raided and ransacked by police officers and
trustees from the House of Detention acting under the direct supervision of the staff
director and the Council for the State Un-American Activities Committee. The home
and office of the director of the Southern Conference Educational Fund were also
raided. Among the dangerous articles removed was Thoreau's Journal. A truck load of
files, membership lists, subscription lists to SCEF's newspaper, correspondence, and
records were removed from SCEF's office, destroying its capacity to function.
60. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 129-30
(1956) (declining to rule on the constitutionality of the Subversive Activities Act, which required
disclosure of officers, funds, and membership of communist organizations); Am. Commc'ns Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950) (explaining that a federal loyalty oath requirement had the
"effect of discouraging the exercise of political rights protected by the First Amendment," but
holding that the state's interests outweighed this effect); see also Kendrick, supra note 57, at 6.
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to single out and punish disfavored viewpoints. For example, in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, Justice Hugo Black
authored a classic dissent likening governmental blacklists to "bills of
attainder."6 1
The first Supreme Court reference to a First Amendment
chilling effect is found in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Wieman
v. Updegrafr2 in 1952. In that case, a unanimous Court struck down a
state statute conditioning state employment on a loyalty oath
requiring that employees swear that they had not been affiliated with
certain organizations designated as "subversive" for the past five
years. The majority held that the requirement failed to fulfill due
process scienter requirements, since an employee may have been
involved with such an organization without knowledge of its
subversive activities. 63 Frankfurter based his concurrence on the First
Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause. He noted that the
plaintiffs in Wieman were teachers at a state university and argued
that the loyalty oath created an "unwarranted inhibition upon the free
spirit of teachers" that "has an unmistakeable [sic] tendency to chill
that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to
cultivate and practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their
associations by potential teachers." 64 Soon thereafter, in Speiser v.
Randall, the Court adopted Frankfurter's reasoning in Wieman,
articulating chilling effect theory as a distinct First Amendment
concept and striking down on First Amendment grounds a state law
that required a loyalty oath of veterans seeking a property tax
exemption.65
Even as McCarthy-era politicians made use of the "pitiless
publicity" of the blacklist and the legislative investigation, the white
majority and its elected representatives in the South were

61. 341 U.S. 123, 144 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
62. 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
63. In a number of cases in this era, the Court relied upon due process rights, rather than
freedom of expression, to shield targets of McCarthyist excess. In United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41 (1953), the Court overturned the contempt conviction of a bookseller who had refused to
divulge the names of the purchasers of certain books in an investigation by the House Select
Committee on Lobbying Activities. Justice Frankfurter's opinion held that the committee had
exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority. Id. at 58. Similarly, in Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957), the Court overturned a contempt conviction for a witness who had refused
to answer questions regarding former communists in a hearing of the House Un-American
Activities Committee. Again invoking the due process clause, the Court held that there is "no
congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." Id. at 200.
64. 344 U.S. at 195.
65. 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
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collaborating to perpetuate Jim Crow.66 Private violence was the de
facto principle of social ordering in the civil rights-era South, and
whether the perpetrators of such violence "happened to use the
mechanism of the government instead of one of the other available
mechanisms was essentially a fortuity."6 7
One common strategy was to use otherwise innocuous
disclosure regulations to harness the power of private stigmatization
and retaliation-a phenomenon Seth Kreimer has called "censorship
by proxy." 68 Given the availability of private violence as a tool of
suppression, state officials learned that they could selectively enforce
these disclosure regulations to, in effect, paint a target on a victim's
back while keeping their own hands clean. Thus, government officials
used seemingly neutral laws to single out and expose activists and
dissidents, knowing that such exposure would result in private
sanctions ranging from social opprobrium to lynching.
NAACP v. Alabama,69 for example, involved the discriminatory
application of a run-of-the-mill state corporate regulation, which
required out-of-state corporations to qualify before doing business in
the state. 70 In prosecuting the NAACP, the state attorney general
enforced the law for the first time against a nonprofit corporation.71
Then, in discovery, the state insisted upon production of the NAACP's
membership lists-a requirement of no apparent relevance to the

66. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 14-16 (noting that the actions of state officials in
opposition to a federal court decision mandating school desegregation "have brought about
violent resistance to that decision in Arkansas"); see also John Dorsett Niles et al., Making Sense
of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 914 (2011); David A. Strauss, State Action After the
Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 412 (1993).
For example, during Mississippi's Freedom Summer of 1965,
[t]hree civil rights workers were murdered by clan agents, four were shot and
wounded, 52 beaten severely enough to warrant reports to the authorities. 250 civil
rights workers were arrested by Mississippi authorities, 13 black churches were
burned to the ground, 17 other buildings used by civil rights groups were damaged by
arson fires or bombs, 10 automobiles were damaged or destroyed, and there were an
additional seven bombings that resulted in no property damage or injury.
Michael E. Tigar, Whose Rights? What Danger?,94 YALE L.J. 970, 975 (1985) (book review).
67. Strauss, supranote 66, at 412.
68. Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries,
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 17 (2006).
69.

357 U.S. 449 (1958).

70. Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61
TENN. L. REV. 869, 890 (1994); Joseph B. Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory
Disclosureof Membership, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 614, 614-19 (1958).
71. Glennon, supranote 70, at 889.
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statute at issue. 72 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court defied its
own precedents,73 ruling that the NAACP could not obtain a hearing
on its constitutional challenge to the prosecution "until it purged itself
of contempt by divulging its membership lists." 74 Collusion between
state courts and law enforcement officials trapped the NAACP in a
procedural Catch-22-it could not argue that producing the
membership lists would violate its constitutional rights until it had
already produced the membership lists. Although Justice Harlan's
opinion-a masterpiece of tight-lipped reserve-did not explicitly call
out the State on its discriminatory enforcement of the law, he ruled
that such forced exposure burdened the organization's constitutional
right of association and that the states' interests in requiring
disclosure of rank and file members were insubstantial. While the
opinion never used the term "chill," the Court clearly employed
chilling effect-based reasoning, explaining that the disclosure
requirement "may induce members to withdraw from the association
and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their
beliefs through their associations and of the consequences of this
exposure."75
Similarly, in Bates v. City of Little Rock,76 NAACP v. Button,77
and Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,78 a state
sought disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists on grounds that
appeared patently fabricated. 79 In Bates, the state asserted that
production of the NAACP's lists was necessary to enforce municipal
license taxes, even though the state failed to show that such licensing

72. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 464. ("Without intimating the slightest view upon the merits of
these issues, we are unable to perceive that the disclosure of petitioner's rank-and-file members
has a substantial bearing on either of them."); see also Robison, supra note 70, at 640 n. 140.
73. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 456 ('We are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of the
Alabama Supreme Court in the present case with its past unambiguous holdings as to the scope
of review available upon a writ of certiorari addressed to a contempt judgment.").
74. Glennon, supra note 70, at 891.
75. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
76. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
77. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
78. 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (reversing contempt conviction for failure to comply with legislative
committee subpoena where committee had failed to show substantial connection between local
race-relations association and Communist activities).
79. In Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court described such cases as NAACP v.
Alabama, Button, and Bates as "attempt[s] to invade protected First Amendment rights by
forcing wholesale disclosure of names and organizational affiliations for a purpose that was not
germane to the determination of whether crime has been committed." Id. at 700.
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was even applicable to a nonprofit organization.80 In Button, a state
law required any group engaged in race-based affirmative litigationbut no other form of litigation-to file its membership list with the
state, among other requirements, while failing to impose the same
requirements on other litigation. In Gibson, a state legislative
committee empowered to investigate communist activities subpoenaed
the NAACP's membership lists, even though there was no evidence of
any involvement by the NAACP in communist activities.81 In all of
these cases, the Court dismissed these purported rationales as
meritless.
2. The Modern Development of Chilling Effect Theory
Outside of the socially and politically fraught context of
McCarthyism and the civil rights movement, the Court began to
recognize that a chilling effect could be constitutionally cognizable
even in the absence of invidious governmental motive. 82 Thus, even
where deterrent effects were the unintended consequences of
regulation, rather than the results of state animus, such deterrence
could give rise to a constitutional claim.
McCarthyism and the civil rights era seem to have heightened
the Court's awareness of the possibilities for state suppression that
were latent in vague or overbroad statutes and seemingly contentneutral regulatory burdens. Having seen such tools used for invidious
purposes, the Court now seemed reluctant to leave their use to the
discretion of government officials, even where there was no evidence of
improper governmental animus.
For example, in Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court struck down
an antipicketing ordinance on its face, even though it was unclear
from the factual record whether the ordinance would have proscribed
the conduct of the particular defendant in the case. 83 The Court held
that the statute was overbroad to the extent that it extended to
peaceful labor picketing, which the First Amendment protected,
regardless of the merits of the prosecution of the particular

80. 361 U.S. at 525 ("In this record we can find no relevant correlation between the power of
the municipalities to impose occupational license taxes and the compulsory disclosure and
publication of the membership lists ....
81. 372 U.S. at 539.
82. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) ("[Albridgement of [First Amendment]
rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental
action.").
83. 310 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1940).
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defendant. 84 Allowing such overbroad statutes, the Court reasoned,
placed all speech at risk of invidious suppression. Although the Court
did not use the term "chilling effect," its language demonstrates its
concern over the deterrent effects of such overbroad laws on protected
speech.85 The Court focused not on any particular animus in the case
before it, but instead upon the potential of overbroad statutes to mask
invidious governmental action in future applications. In later cases,
the Court continued to facially invalidate overbroad loitering and
disorderly conduct statutes, effectively removing such potentially
abusive tools from the state's legislative arsenal.86
Eventually, the Court's concern in chilling effect cases moved
beyond the potential for invidious governmental motivation and
focused directly on two forms of indirect burden. First, procedural
chilling effect applications took shape to protect against the deterrent
effect of uncertainty, whether such uncertainty stemmed from the
inevitable risks of the litigation process (as in Dombrowski)87 or the
similarly inevitable imprecision of any effort at regulatory line
drawing.
For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme
Court used chilling effect-based reasoning to hold that a public figure
could sustain a libel claim only by showing that such statements were
made with "actual malice" (i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless
indifference to the truth).88 The Court explained that a more
expansive definition of actionable libel would create uncertainty in the
minds of prospective critics and could therefore deter protected
speech.89 Thus, in situations where legal rules create doubt in the

84. Id. at 97.
85. The Court reasoned that such an overbroad statute, "which readily lends itself to harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed
to merit their displeasure, results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of
discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Id. at 97-98.
86. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Gooding v. Wilson, 394 U.S. 147
(1969); see also Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "DueProcess," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 51819 (1970) ("[Ilnsensitive procedures can 'chill' the right of free expression. Accordingly, wherever
First Amendment claims are involved, sensitive procedural devices are necessary."); Neuborne,
supra note 57, at 80.
87. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) C"Many persons, rather than undertake the
considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case
litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech, harming not only themselves but
society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) ('There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing
error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.").
88. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
89. Id. at 277-79.
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minds of speakers as to whether their speech is protected, the
resulting chilling effect renders that uncertainty constitutionally
intolerable. The benefit of the doubt must go to the speaker, not the
state.90
Accordingly, the presence of a chilling effect can lead to the
facial invalidation of laws that are flawed for reasons of vagueness 9' or
overbreadth, 92 can forbid administrative regimes that allow
governmental officials unguided discretion to permit speech,93 and can
create a presumption at the margins of certain regulatory categoriessuch as libel,94 obscenity,95 or incitement 96-in favor of the asserted
speech claim. 97
Second, in addition to invalidating laws that created
procedural uncertainty, the Court also began to use chilling effect
theory to invalidate laws that imposed a substantial deterrent effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.98 Prior to this period,
courts would not have treated such deterrence as a cognizable First
Amendment burden, short of an outright prohibition or other concrete
penalty. But the Court began to recognize that "inhibition as well as
prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is
a power denied to government." 99
In Lamont v. Postmaster General, for example, a postal
regulation barred mail delivery of "communist political propaganda" to
any customer who had not submitted a written request for the

90. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (First Amendment standards,
however, "must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech."); see also
Stone, supranote 44, at 79.
91. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 42 (1999); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,
425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264-65 (1967).
92.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973).

93. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 158-59 (1969); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); see also Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947, 964 n.12 (1984) ("By placing discretion in the hands of an official to grant or deny a
license, such a statute creates a threat of censorship that by its very existence chills free
speech."). But see United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 374 (1971)
(upholding seizure of obscene materials by customs officials despite statute's lack of procedural
safeguards).
94. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
FirstAmendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213 (arguing that Sullivan is the result of "a strategy

that requires that speech be overprotected in order to assure that it is not underprotected")
95. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
96. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
97.
98.
99.

Schauer, supra note 6, at 692.
Sedler, supra note 28, at 15; Note, supra note 6, at 809.
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965).
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delivery of such materials.100 The Court reasoned that the state's
asserted interest-protecting recipients from exposure to potentially
offensive material-could be adequately addressed by existing
regulations that allowed a recipient to request a delivery block.
Therefore, the state interests did not justify the burden on First
Amendment freedoms imposed by the regulation. Similarly, in Shelton
v. Tucker, the Court used chilling effect-based reasoning to strike
down a state statute compelling every public school teacher to file
annually an affidavit listing every organization to which she had
belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years. 01
Of course, the bare assertion of a chilling effect would not
suffice to invalidate a statute. Instead, applying standard balancing
analysis, the Court would assess the severity of the deterrent effect
against the substantiality of the state's interest in the challenged
regulation.102 For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court held fiveto-four that the First Amendment does not preclude requiring
reporters to testify regarding confidential sources before a grand
jury.103 The Court used balancing analysis to hold that the "overriding
and compelling state interest"104 in the investigation of crime by the
grand jury outweighed any chilling effect on newsgathering or
reporting. By contrast, in Talley v. California,the Court struck down
a statute that prohibited the distribution of handbills that did not
bear the names and addresses of their proponents.105 The Court noted
that the purported state interest in this regulation-to provide a
means of identifying "those responsible for fraud, false advertising and

100. Id. at 310; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 760 (1996) (striking down provision that required, with respect to leased access channels,
that cable-system operators place patently offensive programming on separate channel, block
channel from viewer access, and unblock channel within thirty days of subscriber's written
request).
101. 364 U.S. 479, 489-490 (1960).

102. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 191 (1983).
103. 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972); see also Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 196-97 (1990)
(rejecting argument that disclosure of academic peer evaluations to the EEOC would result in an
unconstitutional chilling effect on candid evaluations and discussions of candidates); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 198 (1979) (upholding required disclosure of editorial conversations and
reporters' notes in a libel action, reasoning that any chilling effect on freedom of the press
resulting from such disclosure was outweighed by the state's interest in adjudicating defamation
lawsuits).
104. Branzburg,408 U.S. at 700.
105. 362 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1960).
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libel"-bore no relation to the broad sweep of the prohibition at
issue.106
As we have seen in this Part, from its tumultuous origins in the
1950s and 60s, the chilling effect concept eventually became
normalized as part of First Amendment jurisprudence in three
principal ways. First, courts used the chilling effect concept to
invalidate actions that represented invidious efforts at governmental
suppression, whether such efforts resulted from legislative enactments
or from executive enforcement decisions. Second, on a procedural
level, courts used chilling effect doctrine to invalidate laws that were
defective by creating unwarranted uncertainty, such as statutes that
were vague or overbroad. Third, on a substantive level, courts
incorporated deterrence burdens into standard First Amendment
balancing analysis so that chilling effects were treated as the
equivalent of any other burdens on First Amendment rights.
III. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE ACTION

As it was incorporated into First Amendment jurisprudence,
the chilling effect concept expanded the category of which of a law's
indirect effects count as a constitutionally cognizable burden on
expressive freedoms. Under chilling effect theory's expansive
reasoning, any indirect consequence that deterred speech could
potentially constitute an unconstitutional burden so long as the
threshold requirements of state action were satisfied.
But this expansive logic tended to overlook one aspect of
chilling effect theory that I argue is both normatively and doctrinally
salient-the source of chill. Specifically, as chilling effect doctrine
developed, it failed to differentiate between chilling effects arising
from governmental action and chilling effects arising from private
action. I will explore some of the normative and doctrinal
consequences of this distinction in Part IV, but in this Part, I will first
continue to sketch the historical development of chilling effect doctrine
beyond its formative period. In particular, I will explain how the Court
began to grapple with emerging private-action problems in First

106. Id. at 64; see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 205
(1999) (invalidating statute requiring that initiative-petition circulators wear identification
badge and that proponents of an initiative report names and addresses of all paid circulators and
amount paid to each circulator); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Bd., 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(invalidating state statute requiring all campaign literature to bear the name and address of its
distributor, reasoning that state's antifraud interest was already protected through criminal
prohibitions on false statements).
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Amendment chilling effect cases. I will then provide working
definitions for governmental chill and private chill.
A. The HarassmentExemption and PrivateAction
As chilling effect doctrine developed, the category of
consequences that were deemed to constitute an actionable chilling
effect expanded to encompass a new and potentially problematic
category: the consequences of private action. Since the theory's initial
development in the McCarthy-era and civil rights-era cases, First
Amendment chilling effect cases have often considered deterrent
consequences arising from a mix of governmental and private action.
As noted above, in the "censorship by proxy" cases of the 1950s and
1960s, such as NAACP v. Alabama, Bates, and Gibson, government
officials who wished to suppress speech and associational rights were
able to selectively manipulate existing laws requiring disclosure,
knowing that both official and private retaliation were a certain
result. In these cases, the Court acknowledged that private action
could substantially contribute to a deterrent effect on First
Amendment rights. However, in those cases, the Court recognized that
governmental animus was the driving force behind the chilling
effect. 107
But as chilling effect doctrine expanded beyond these
"censorship by proxy" cases and began to consider burdens that were
the unintended consequences of governmental regulation, courts
began to suggest, at least in dicta, that an unconstitutional chilling
effect could arise solely from the consequences of private action as long
as some form of state action was present in the chain of causation.108
107. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) ("This repressive effect,
while in part the result of private attitudes and pressures, was brought to bear only after the
exercise of governmental power had threatened to force disclosure of the members' names.");
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) ("The crucial factor is the interplay of
governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power
represented by the production order that private action takes hold.").
108. Because of the unusual way in which the chilling effect doctrine encompasses the
deterrent consequences of private action, the private-action problem examined in this paper is
conceptually distinct from a typical state-action problem. A state-action problem will often pose
the question: Under what circumstances, if any, should a private actor be subject to
constitutional requirements? For some relatively recent takes on this longstanding debate, see,
for example, Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principleand Its Critics,96 VA. L.
REV. 1767 (2010); John Dorsett Niles et al., Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 885 (2011); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO.
L.J. 779 (2004); and Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, State Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L.
465 (2002). But state action poses a threshold inquiry as to whether a particular dispute should
be deemed to be a constitutional case at all. Chilling effect doctrine, by contrast, focuses on a
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This possibility was most clearly articulated in the "harassment
exemption" line of cases that were at issue in Doe v. Reed. This line of
cases considered the possibility of constitutionally compelled
exemptions to otherwise applicable campaign-finance disclosure laws.
The harassment exemption has its origins in the per curiam
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which considered a multitude of
constitutional challenges to various provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act.109 In particular, the Buckley Court decided a challenge
by minor political parties who claimed that the compelled disclosure of
political contributions chilled their expressive and associational
rights. First, the Court analyzed a facial challenge to the requirement
as an infringement of the "privacy of association and belief guaranteed
by the First Amendment."110 In the facial challenge, the Court
explicitly recognized the possibility of a chilling effect, including the
possibility of private retaliation: "It is undoubtedly true that public
disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will
deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some
instances, disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or
retaliation."'
Despite this chilling effect, the Court upheld the
regulation, given the importance of the state interests at issue.
But the Buckley Court explicitly carved out the possibility of a
future as-applied challenge if there were "a reasonable probability
that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will
subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either
Government officials or private parties."112 This standard, derived
from the chilling effect analysis in NAACP v. Alabama,113 is the
harassment exemption at issue in the as-applied challenge in Doe v.
Reed and other contemporary disclosure challenges.
By lumping together deterrent effects resulting from the
actions of both "[g]overnment officials [and] private parties," the
Buckley Court suggests that, for the purposes of First Amendment
chilling effect analysis, harassment or retaliation by private parties is
the equivalent of harassment or retaliation by governmental entities.
later stage of constitutional analysis than the state-action inquiry. Chilling effect-based
reasoning expands the category of constitutional injury to include the consequences of both
governmental and private action. The problem of private action under chilling effect doctrine
asks the question: Should the same First Amendment framework govern the analysis of chilling
effects deriving from governmental action and chilling effects deriving from private action?
109. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
110. Id. at 64.
111. Id. at 68.
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id.
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Moreover, the language in which the Buckley Court phrased the
harassment exemption seems to suggest that a chilling effect resulting
from private actions alone can be the basis for such an exemption.
Despite the suggestive language in which the harassment
exemption is phrased, the Court has never granted a harassment
exemption in an instance where the deterrent effect resulted only from
private actions, without any element of governmental wrongdoing.
Indeed, although the harassment-exemption language has been
dutifully recited in a number of election-related disclosure challenges,
the only time the Supreme Court has actually granted such a
harassment exemption was in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Committee,114 in which the Court granted an exemption
from campaign-finance disclosure requirements to "a minor political
party which historically ha[d] been the object of harassment by
government officials and private parties."115 The factual record in
Brown reflected "substantial evidence of both governmental and
private hostility toward and harassment of SWP [the Socialist
Workers Party] members and supporters."1 16 Such harassment was
extensive and severe, including shots fired at an SWP office, the
retaliatory discharge of at least twenty-two SWP members by their
employers, and "massive" past and present governmental surveillance
and harassment.117 Thus, like the earlier censorship-by-proxy cases
discussed above, Brown did not result solely from the consequences of
private action, but involved an element of governmental wrongdoing.
But in Doe v. Reed and other recent disclosure cases, the
element of governmental wrongdoing has fallen away; no one seriously
suggests that Washington's longstanding Public Records Act or other
generally applicable disclosure statutes were enacted in order to
suppress disfavored viewpoints or groups, nor that those statutes have
been discriminatorily enforced for invidious purposes. Moreover,
courts have uniformly rejected the argument that generally applicable
election-related disclosure statutes impose disproportionate burdens
on First Amendment rights as a facial matter."18 Instead, employing
standard balancing analysis, courts have found that any burdens on
First Amendment rights resulting from electoral-disclosure statutes
are outweighed by the important state interests of combating
114. 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982).
115. Id. at 88.
116. Id. at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. at 99-100.
118. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 91314 (2010); McConnell v. FCC, 540 U.S. 93, 199 (2003).
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corruption and providing voters with information relevant to their
decisions at the ballot box. Accordingly, in Doe v. Reed, an eight-to-one
majority of the Court rejected the facial challenge that disclosure
requirements for petition signatories were overly burdensome or
otherwise constitutionally defective. Thus, the issue presented in the
Doe v. Reed as-applied challenge and other recent disclosure
challenges is an issue of pure private chill, as I will explain and
further define in the next section.
B. Governmental Chill v. Private Chill
As we saw in the previous sections, chilling effect casesparticularly in the disclosure context-will often present situations in
which a speaker fears retaliatory actions by both state and private
actors. In the next sections, I attempt to divide these situations into
two principal categories: (1) those situations in which the chilling
effect derives from the government's violation of a constitutional rule
and (2) those situations in which the chilling effect derives from
specific acts by private parties.
1. Defining Governmental Chill
We will start by defining the boundaries of the category of
government chill. Chilling effect cases have generally followed the
foundational principles of First Amendment doctrine. Of course, there
are nearly as many formulations of these principles as there are First
Amendment cases and commentators, but certainly one of these
principles is that the government, when acting as regulator, must
remain neutral among competing viewpoints and speakers.
Distinctions drawn by the state on the basis of content or viewpoint
are therefore presumptively suspect. 119 A second such principle is that
the government should not promulgate procedurally defective rules,
such as vague or overbroad laws that create unjustified uncertainty
costs.12 0 A third such foundational principle is that the government
must not impose disproportionate or unjustified burdens on free
expression, so that any law burdening free expression must be tailored
119. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Police Dep't of
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Albove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."); see also Dorf, supra note 44, at 1181.
120. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 9.
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to advance a sufficiently important state interest.121 I am not asserting
that these three hastily sketched principles are either exhaustive or
authoritative. Instead, my point is that these principles can be stated
as rules constraining the government.
In Matthew Adler's influential account, First Amendment
doctrine, like much of constitutional jurisprudence, largely treats
expressive and associational rights as "rights against rules." 122 That
is, for the most part First Amendment doctrine does not directly
protect the act of speaking itself; it instead shields the speaker from
governmental sanction under an invalid rule (i.e., a rule that violates
a First Amendment principle such as the three principles sketched in
the previous paragraph).
To take the example of flag burning, in Texas v. Johnson, the
Court invalidated a flag-desecration statute on the grounds that the
government may not "proscribe particular conduct because it has
expressive elements" without demonstrating a significant interest in
doing so. 12 3 However, had the act of burning the flag fallen within a
general prohibition against arson, no First Amendment issue would
have been raised. Thus, it is not the act of burning a flag-even for
expressive purposes-that the First Amendment protects. Instead, the
First Amendment protects the speaker against an unconstitutionally
discriminatory rule. The rule is invalid because it violates the First
Amendment principle of governmental neutrality.
This "rule-invalidity" formulation is helpful in explaining much
of the chilling effect doctrine. For example, as Henry Monaghan
explained in his classic analysis of overbreadth doctrine, an
overbreadth claim cannot be characterized as a claim of privilegethat the plaintiffs conduct is somehow constitutionally immune from
regulation. 124 Indeed, in overbreadth cases, the plaintiffs conduct is
not the focus of the court's inquiry. The plaintiff instead asserts a
right that his "conduct be judged in accordance with a rule that is
constitutionally valid."125 The antipicketing statute at issue in
Thornhill failed the rule-validity standard because it was procedurally
defective; it swept in more constitutionally protected conduct than was
warranted.

121. Adler, supra note 12, at 13; Stone, supra note 102, at 191.
122. Adler, supra note 12, at 13; see also Dorf, supra note 12, at 128; Monaghan, supra note
12, at 9.

123. 491 U.S. at 406.
124. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 4.

125. Id. at 8.

2013]

THE CHILLING EFFECT & PRIVATE ACTION

1501

Similarly, the oath requirement in Speiser can be deemed an
invalid rule because it violated First Amendment neutrality norms.
The speech-deterring regulations at issue in Lamont, Shelton, or
Talley can be considered invalid rules because they were poorly
tailored to the governmental interests they purportedly advanced. The
libel statute in New York Times v. Sullivan and the movie censorship
statute in Freedman can both be deemed invalid rules because they
imposed unwarranted uncertainty costs on the exercise of expressive
rights. Such analysis also extends to cases like NAACP v. Alabama, in
which the law itself-the corporate registration requirement-was
innocuous, but the state violated neutrality principles through its
discriminatory enforcement and prosecution of the statute. 126
Thus, the category of governmental chill can extend to cases
where (1) constitutional state-action requirements are satisfied, (2) a
chilling effect has occurred, and (3) the government has violated a
constitutional "rule," in the sense this term is used above. The
category of governmental chill will encompass instances where a
chilling effect renders a statute facially invalid 27 but will also extend
to instances where a statute may be valid on its face but involve badfaith prosecution or enforcement, as in NAACP v. Alabama or
Dombrowski.
2. Defining Private Chill
Having set out the boundaries of governmental chill, we can
now try to define the category of private chill by contradistinction. 128
In a private chill case, (1) constitutional state-action requirements are
satisfied and (2) a chilling effect has resulted but (3) the government

126. See Samaha, supra note 57, at 1300. But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects
of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1236 (2010) (arguing that, as a textual matter, First
Amendment challenges should extend only to judicial review of legislative action, not to judicial
review of executive action).
127. Relatedly, Marc Isserles has argued that statutes may be facially invalid for two
reasons: (1) an "overbreadth" challenge asserts that a statute is facially invalid because "an
otherwise valid rule of law" would have too many unconstitutional applications and (2) a "valid
rule" facial challenge asserts that a statute possesses some defect other than overbreadth that
renders it invalid in all its applications, for example that it has a constitutionally illegitimate
purpose. Isserles, supra note 12, at 363-64.
128. I do not claim that the categories of governmental and private chill exhaust the
universe of chilling effect claims. It is possible to envision an instance in which a statute passes
facial constitutional muster, but a cognizable chilling effect results from some combination of
circumstances that are not private retaliatory action.
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has violated no First Amendment "rule"129 and (4) the source of chill is
specific action by private parties.
To apply this definition to the example of Doe v. Reed, where
state action was present, (1) the state's action in enacting the PRA
was at least a necessary condition for the disclosure of the petition
signatories and any subsequent private harassment, (2) plaintiffs
asserted that the possibility of harassment chilled their political
involvement, (3) the PRA passed facial constitutional muster, and (4)
the source of chill was, first, the action of same-sex-marriage
advocates in posting signatory information on a website and, second,
anticipated harassment by private parties.
This definition, however, seems open to the following objection.
Where an otherwise constitutionally inoffensive governmental action
enables private reactions that create a severe chilling effect on a group
of speakers, does the government violate a constitutional rule if it does
not exempt that group of speakers from the rule? Certainly one could
articulate a constitutional rule mandating that where a governmental
action has the effect of enabling chilling private action, it violates the
First Amendment for the state to take that action. The problem with
this proposed "rule," however, is that it bears little relation to existing
First Amendment doctrine. As explained above, under general First
Amendment doctrine, an incidental effect of an otherwise valid law
will not normally entitle a speaker to a constitutionally compelled
exemption. 130
A further clarification may be useful. The mere presence of
private action-even when such action contributes to a deterrent
effect-is not sufficient to transform a governmental chill case into a
private chill case. In other words, both governmental chill cases and
private chill cases may involve deterrent actions by private parties.
The dividing line between the two categories turns on whether the
government has violated a constitutional rule, not on the mere
presence or absence of some level of private action.
Indeed, the risk of private retaliation currently is, and should
be, taken into account in the overall assessment of whether the state
has promulgated or enforced a constitutionally infirm rule. For
129. This will often correlate to instances in which a given regulation is deemed to be facially
valid. But a governmental action can violate a constitutional rule even where the statute itself
bears no facial infirmity, for example, through discriminatory enforcement. See supra notes 12728 and accompanying text. Thus, the category of "rule invalidity" will encompass some laws that
are invalid as-applied (based on the way in which a facially constitutional rule is enforced or
interpreted) as well as encompassing facially unconstitutional laws.
130. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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example, in Buckley, as in Doe,131 the Court considered the likelihood
of private harassment at two separate points in its analysis. First, in
the facial challenge to disclosure laws, it acknowledged the possibility
that "disclosure may expose contributors to harassment or
retaliation." 132 The Court considered this potential for private
harassment to be part of the general burden that disclosure laws
impose. Employing an "exacting scrutiny" standard, it held that this
burden was justified by the state's important interests in the
disclosure laws. 133 Thus, to use the framework developed in this
Article, there was no "governmental chill" because there was no
violation of a constitutional rule: the Court's balancing analysis was
satisfied because the state interests at issue justified the burden that
the law imposed.
But the Buckley Court also explained that private acts of
harassment could be considered at a separate, second phase of the
analysis-as the basis for a potential as-applied challenge seeking a
"harassment exemption" from disclosure law. 134 To the extent that
specific groups could demonstrate a particularly severe risk of
harassment, they could claim the benefit of such a harassment
exemption. As I previously explained in Part III.A, I disagree with the
Buckley Court's analysis to the extent that it lumped together
governmental and private harassment. But it does make sense for
overall balancing to take into account the generalized risk of private
harassment and to insist that sufficiently important state interests
justify such a risk. It is only once a statute passes such overall
balancing analysis (or other applicable standard) in the first phase of
analysis that the private chill question comes into play in the second
phase.
Thus, chilling effect cases involving private actions mandate a
two-phase analysis: A court should first determine whether the
government has chilled expression by violating a constitutional rule.
Only once the court has determined that there is no governmental
chill should a court turn to the analysis of private chill.
This is because, in constitutional law, we think of injury
resulting from a governmental violation as different in kind from an
equivalently severe consequence that results from a lawful state

131. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.

132. 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976).
133. Id. at 16-67.
134. Id. at 68.
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action, even though the real-world effects may be comparable. 35 To
return to the flag-burning example, we consider it constitutionally
salient if the government punishes a protester under a content-based
law forbidding flag desecration but not if the protester receives an
identical consequence under a content-neutral law forbidding arson.
The state's violation of neutrality creates a constitutional
consequence, not merely an adverse consequence. The First
Amendment injury at issue is not merely the injury of being deterred
from speaking, but rather of being subjected to an invalid rule.136
Even if private action contributes to the deterrence effect, the
government's violation of a constitutional norm "transforms the
nature of the harm." 137 In Miami Herald, for example, private actions
-the political opponent's particular response editorials-certainly
contributed to the chilling effect of the right-of-reply statute on the
newspaper's editorial decisions. But Miami Herald is properly deemed
a governmental chill case because the state violated First Amendment
norms of neutrality by imposing a content-based penalty on speech.
Similarly, in the censorship-by-proxy cases, such as NAACP v.
Alabama, private acts of retaliation or violence were unquestionably a
major-if not the major-component of the chilling effect created by
the mandated disclosure of the membership lists. But the state's
violation of neutrality norms through invidious discrimination created
a further category of harm in addition to the direct consequences of
private harassment. 3 8 Likewise, in cases like Talley, the burden
imposed upon the speakers largely stemmed from a "fear of reprisal"
from private parties.139 But the resulting burden on speech and
privacy rights was not justified by the state's asserted interest in the
law. The burdens on expressive freedoms were therefore not tailored
to an important state interest and did not satisfy balancing
requirements, violating a constitutional rule. Thus, in NAACP v.
Alabama and Talley, the government's First Amendment violations

135. Alexander, supra note 44, at 931-54; Dorf, supra note 44, at 1183; Elena Kagan, Private

Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 413, 443-505 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 767, 775-98 (2001); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions on Speech and the First

Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalizationof the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 401, 415-20 (1995); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 190, 195-204 (1988).
136.
137.
138.
139.

Adler, supra note 12, at 13; Monaghan, supranote 12, at 8.
Dorf, supranote 44, at 1183.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
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mean that these cases, too, are properly classified as governmental
chill cases, despite the presence of private action.
IV. THE NORMATIVE STAKES
In this Part, I explain that the distinction between
governmental chill and private chill is rooted in the normative
justifications for chilling effect doctrine. In particular, the mandate for
judicial intervention in governmental chill cases does not appear to
extend to private chill cases. Moreover, analyzing private chill cases
under a chilling effect rubric leads to significant concerns about
separation of powers and judicial unilateralism. Instead, I argue that
private chill cases are better conceptualized as requests for
accommodation: an argument that a court should intervene to
facilitate the exercise of a speaker's First Amendment rights, even at
the expense of the preexisting entitlements of private parties.
A. Positive-Rights and Negative-Rights Accounts
Generally, the mandate for judicial intervention in a First
Amendment case can be understood either as a negative- or a positiverights claim: 140 the argument is either that the court should intervene
to prevent the government from trespassing constitutional boundaries,
or that the court should intervene in order to enhance First
Amendment values such as public discourse, deliberation, or
autonomy.
In the constitutional context, a negative right is a right to
pursue one's aims without governmental interference, while a positive
right is an entitlement or guarantee that may require affirmative
governmental facilitation.141 The core of negative First Amendment
140. This distinction is drawn from Isaiah Berlin's foundational distinction between negative
and positive liberty. ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 4 (1958), available at
http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/wiso-vwl/johannes/Ankuendigungen/Berlin-twoconceptsofliberty.pdf. Berlin's formulation does not map neatly onto American constitutional theory;
he conceptualized negative liberty as the freedom to pursue one's goals without interference by
others and positive liberty encompassed self-actualization and self-determination.
141. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at xi (1978); Frank B. Cross, The Errorof
Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864 (2001); Dorf, supra note 44, at 1244. A number of

scholars, building from legal-realist critiques, have criticized this distinction, arguing that the
concept of a "negative" right is illusory since all rights depend, to some extent, upon legal
enforcement. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS UPON TAXES (1999).
Most constitutional rights, such as the right against self-incrimination or the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, are considered to be negative rights, which
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reasoning is a strong presumption against governmental censorship or
other state suppression of speech. 142 Moving beyond this core, the
negative account of the First Amendment also extends to
nonpurposive abridgments of free expression, such as those in which
the asserted state interests do not justify the resulting burden on
expression.143 In all of these instances, the First Amendment functions
as a shield against state overreaching.
At the same time, many First Amendment theorists have
argued that freedom of expression also incorporates an important
positive-rights component: 144 freedom of expression is constitutionally
sacrosanct, in part because it is instrumental to such ends as truth,
self-governance, and individual autonomy. 145 Freedom of expression is
one of the few rights that constitutional theorists have deemed to
include such a positive, consequentialist element.146 Under a positiverights conception of free expression, governmental actions to enhance
the opportunities for expression would be constitutionally favored, if
not actually required. For example, a court following the positive-

convey no affirmative entitlement but simply confer protection against prohibited governmental
action. Schauer, supra note 6, at 692 n.37.
142. Generations of courts and commentators have taken note of the fact that the First
Amendment itself is phrased in negative terms ("Congress shall make no law..."), and there is
widespread consensus that freedom of expression contains an indispensable negative component.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); see also
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); TRIBE, supra note 44, at
790; Alexander, supra note 44, at 955; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 616; Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking:

Constitutional Interpretationand Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405,
1424 (1987); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 886 (1986); Strauss, supra note 66, at 334.
143. Cass, supranote 142, at 1477-78.
144. See, e.g., STEPHEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 177
n.35 (1995); Dorf, supra note 44, at 1225; Farber, supra note 25, at 569-70; Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, PracticalReason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1640-42
(1987); Schauer, supra note 6, at 692. But see Cass, supra note 142, at 1424.
145. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); THOMAS
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Robert Post, The ConstitutionalConcept
of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 685 (1990).
146. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 6, at 692 n.37 (citing the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the Equal Protection Clause as other "positive" guarantees).
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rights conception might require the state to accommodate the exercise
of expressive freedoms under certain circumstances.
Examples of such constitutionally compelled accommodation,
however, are relatively rare in the case law, and it is difficult to
identify cases in which a court has held that the First Amendment
requires affirmative action to enhance positive rights.147 After all, one
could always argue that the state opening a library rather than a
prison or exempting publishers from otherwise applicable business
taxes would enhance the opportunities for expression. But to recognize
every missed enhancement opportunity as a constitutional claim
would obviously create impossible floodgates problems, as well as
raise separation of powers concerns.148
In most cases, the distinction between positive and negative
rights-though of considerable consequence to scholars-has little
traction in practical terms. This is because most First Amendment
cases will involve both positive and negative First Amendment values.
For example, a law that criminalizes the criticism of elected officials
violates the First Amendment not only because public discourse is
deprived of ideas and expression, but also because there are good
reasons not to trust elected officials to shape public discourse,
especially in a way that entrenches their own ascendancy. But the
positive- versus negative-rights distinction is foundational to
understanding the normative
justifications for traditional
governmental chill cases and why these justifications do not apply to
the category of private chill.
B. The Positive-RightsAccount of the Chilling Effect Concept
Theorists who have considered the chilling effect concept have
generally suggested that its normative justifications rest on a positive147. Several commentators have located such a positive-rights conception in public-forum
doctrine, where the government is, under certain circumstances, required to provide space for
the exercise of expressive freedoms. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983)
(holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the use of the sidewalks around the Supreme
Court building for purposes of peaceful picketing and leafletting); see also Marvin Ammori, First
Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 16; Currie, supra note 142, at 886; Farber, supra
note 25, at 554, 574. Others have discerned such a positive-rights component in the heckler's
veto cases, in which it is suggested that, under certain circumstances, the state may have an
affirmative obligation to protect a speaker against a hostile audience rather than silence the
speaker. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) ("Maintenance of the opportunity
for free political discussion is a basic tenet of our constitutional democracy."); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963); see also Herzog, supra note 8, at 23; Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Reply to Critics,27 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 418 (2011).
148. Cross, supra note 141, at 888; Dorf, supra note 44, at 1144, 1179.
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rights conception of the First Amendment. 149 For example, in his
seminal and still-authoritative account of chilling effect theory,
Frederick Schauer argues that the chilling effect concept is predicated
upon the assumption that speech is a "preferred value."150 Accordingly,
chilling effect doctrine reflects "the view that the harm caused by the
chilling of free speech (or other protected activity) is comparatively
greater than the harm resulting from the chilling of the other
activities involved."151 Thus, in Schauer's account, the chilling effect
concept's doctrinal mandate is "that legal rules be formulated so as to
allocate the risk of error away from the preferred value [of free
expression], thereby minimizing the occurrence of those errors which
we deem the most harmful."152
Similarly, in a public-choice-theory spin on this argument,
Daniel Farber explains First Amendment doctrine by conceptualizing
information as a public good. 153 According to this conception, markets
and political systems tend to undervalue information, leading to its
production at suboptimal levels.15 4 The value of information to the
individual who produces it is far less than its value to society as a
whole; that is, information has positive externalities.15 5 Accordingly,
laws regulating speech will systematically overdeter the production of
speech.15 6 Thus, it makes sense to subsidize the production of speech,
and the chilling effect concept is one example of such a speech
subsidy. 15 7 In this account, chilling effect doctrine represents special
constitutional protection for the production of valuable, yet potentially
vulnerable, information.
The positive-rights account of chilling effect doctrine is
predicated on the affirmative value of speech, which is considered a
"preferred value." The actionability of chilling effects under the First
Amendment is presumed to advance the instrumental values
underlying expressive and associational rights-to enrich public
discourse, facilitate deliberative self-government, enhance individual
autonomy, or some other such end.
149. Schauer, supranote 6, at 705; Farber, supra note 25, at 569-70; Kendrick, supranote 6,
at 1656; Note, supra note 6, at 841.
150. Schauer, supranote 6, at 705.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (First Amendment
standards "must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech").
153. Farber, supra note 25, at 555.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 558.
156. Id. at 568.
157. Id. at 568-70.
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But the positive-rights account of the chilling effect concept
falls short in two important respects. First, the positive-rights account
does not give adequate weight to the important negative-rights
function of the chilling effect in governmental chill cases. Although
recognition of the chilling effect in government chill cases may
arguably advance positive First Amendment values, it also performs
its more familiar negative-rights task of shielding the exercise of
rights against governmental overreaching. Second, the "preferred
value" assumption is potentially untrue as well as normatively
problematic in private chill cases.
1. Government Chill
First, the positive-rights account of the chilling effect concept
tends to understate the extent to which governmental chill cases
embody and advance the negative values of the First Amendment. In
those cases, as explained above, the chilling effect stems from the
government's violation of a First Amendment rule. Thus, as the
concept of the chilling effect in governmental chill cases has
developed, it has not merely helped advance such positive values as
autonomy and self-government. It has also, crucially, performed a
negative-rights function, providing a means for courts to police and
prevent governmental violations of First Amendment norms.
As we saw in our brief survey of the McCarthy-era and
civil rights-era cases, invidious governmental motivation that we
would now consider viewpoint discrimination was apparent on the
record in many of these seminal governmental chill cases. 158 But even
in cases where no such animus was present, the Court repeatedly
emphasized the principle that defective laws violate the First
Amendment, not merely because they unnecessarily impoverish public
discourse, but also because they provide tools by which unscrupulous
officials might suppress disfavored viewpoints or groups.159 The
McCarthy era and the civil rights era provided ample historical
examples that governmental officials should not be trusted with such
tools, even where such tools were neutral on their face and did not
purport to regulate expression.
158. See Kendrick, supra note 57, at 1. See generally supra Part

II.B.

159. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (emphasizing that vague laws
create "dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
98 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) ("The struggle for the freedom of the
press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor."); see also Farber, supra note 25,
at 562; Srinivasan, supranote 135, at 401; Strauss, supra note 135, at 196.
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Even beyond the possibility of invidious or potential chill, there
are good reasons for rules against government actions that
inadvertently deter disproportionate amounts of speech. We do not
want governmental regulators to be so insensitive to First
Amendment values that they indirectly impose disproportionate
burdens on speech; nor do we want the drafters of regulatory rules to
be so careless that they unintentionally sweep significant amounts of
protected speech in with other targets of regulation. Although in a
governmental chill case a court may not necessarily be shielding the
exercise of First Amendment rights against direct regulation or
suppression, the court still has an important negative role to play in
such regulation or suppression through indirection or inadvertence. 160
In addition to this negative-rights role, recognition of the
chilling effect concept in governmental chill cases is presumed to
advance positive First Amendment values by giving the benefit of the
doubt to the speaker, rather than to the state. Thus, both a negativerights and a positive-rights account of free expression provide a
normative mandate for judicial intervention in governmental chill
cases.
2. Private Chill
In contrast to governmental chill cases, neither a negativerights nor a positive-rights account of the First Amendment seems to
provide a mandate for judicial intervention in private chill cases. By
definition, recognition of a chilling effect claim in private chill cases
will not advance negative First Amendment values since the
government has violated no constitutional norm. Instead, in private
chill cases, any salience that the chilling effect concept has must be
predicated entirely on the positive-rights assumption that protecting
against the asserted chilling effect will enhance public discourse or
otherwise have a speech-positive overall outcome.
But a pure positive rights justification is on shaky doctrinal
ground. As mentioned above, courts have only espoused a positiverights view of the First Amendment in scattered dicta, and in the
cases where those dicta arose, the negative justifications for free
expression were also in play.161 More pertinently here, whatever the
160. Similarly, in her influential account of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine,
Kathleen Sullivan argues that the doctrine "preserves spheres of private ordering from
government domination and ensures that citizens receive appropriately evenhanded treatment
from government." Sullivan, supra note 54, at 1506.
161. See note 147 and accompanying text.
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merits of positive rights as a descriptive theory of First Amendment
doctrine, the positive-rights account of chilling effect doctrine does not
justify the extension of chilling effect protections to private chill cases.
As Professor Schauer has explained, chilling effect doctrine
incorporates a "preferred value" assumption: "the view that the harm
caused by the chilling of free speech (or other protected activity) is
comparatively greater than the harm resulting from the chilling of the
other activities involved." 162 After all, if speech is deemed to be the
"preferred value," then one can safely assume that structuring a
presumption to favor a chilled speaker at the expense of other
interests will result in a net gain to First Amendment values, since
only the speaker is presumed to have speech interests at stake. But
this assumption, grounded in a positive-rights conception of the First
Amendment, does not necessarily hold true in private chill cases.
Such an assumption may make sense in governmental chill
cases when the state is on the other side of the equation. We are
generally content in such situations to give the benefit of the doubt to
the speaker, not to the state. But the assumption that recognizing a
chilling effect will enhance First Amendment rights becomes highly
problematic in private chill cases.
As noted above, private chill cases will often involve instances
where speech is "on both sides of the equation."1 63 If a chilled activity
consists of protected expression, a private actor's response to that
activity will also often involve some expressive element. The
"preferred value" assumption breaks down if the response itself is
constitutionally favored speech.
For example, consider Protectmarriage.comv. Bowen, a case in

which contributors to California's anti-gay marriage initiative,
Proposition 8, brought a First Amendment challenge to the legally
compelled disclosure of their contributions.164 Like the plaintiffs in
Doe, these plaintiffs sought an as-applied exemption to disclosure
based on alleged harassment. The court dismissed their suit, but had
plaintiffs succeeded in blocking disclosure of the contributions, the
public dialogue in the state and nation might have been significantly
impoverished. Enormous public controversy and discussion
surrounded the revelation that members of the Mormon Church both
in and out of California had contributed as much as half of the $40
162. Schauer, supra note 6, at 705; see also id. at 687 ("[A]n erroneous limitation of speech
has, by hypothesis, more social disutility than an erroneous overextension of freedom of
speech.").
163. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
164. Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
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million spent to advance Proposition 8.165 This fact not only was of
relevance to California's voters in making their decisions at the ballot
box, but also sparked a nationwide debate regarding the role of
organized religion in politics. Moreover, the role of corporations and
other business entities providing financial support to Proposition 8
provoked consumer boycotts and much public discussion.
Under existing First Amendment doctrine, a court would count
such gains to public discourse only as furthering a legitimate state
interest-such as the voters' "informational interest" 166-that might
serve to justify the constitutional harm of deterring contributions. But
a court would not question whether such gains to public discourse
themselves possessed any countervailing constitutional heft. Yet, in
terms of its net effect on public discourse, a chilling effect on
contributions is by no means obviously more harmful than a judicial
act that prevents activists and journalists from engaging in
constitutionally protected speech and would deprive voters of
politically relevant information. Indeed, it is equally possible that the
dialogue enabled by such disclosures could substantially outweigh any
net loss to public discourse resulting from those deterred from
participating. 167
In private chill cases, then, it is no longer clear that shielding a
speaker against an asserted chilling effect will necessarily advance
positive First Amendment values. Accordingly, in private chill cases,
the concept of a "preferred value" that undergirds the positive-rights
account of chilling effect theory becomes highly problematic. As
Richard Fallon has argued in other contexts, "The argument for
preferring overenforcement to underenforcement of rights has no bite
in genuinely zero-sum contests between competing claims of
fundamental rights."168 In private chill situations, the usual normative
justifications for constitutional protections are difficult to discern, if
not entirely absent. Thus, neither a negative-rights nor a positiverights account of the First Amendment appears to provide a mandate
for judicial intervention in private chill cases.
165. Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at Al; Mark Schoofs, Mormons Boost Antigay MarriageEffort, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2008, at AS.
166. See, e.g., McConnell v. FCC, 540 U.S. 93, 276 (2003).
167. As Seth Kreimer has put it, "If the interplay of social pressure is a crucial element of
the formation of public opinion, itself protected and fostered by the First Amendment, disclosures
that facilitate the deployment of such social pressures should be, if not required, at least
constitutionally favored." Kreimer, supra note 53, at 64.
168. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1693, 1730-31 (2008).
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3. Separation of Powers and Judicial Unilateralism
In addition to the absence of a clear negative- or positive-rights
mandate for judicial intervention in private chill cases, the extension
of chilling effect-based reasoning in such cases generates particular
concerns about separation of powers and judicial unilateralism. The
perpetually vexed question of judicial review becomes particularly
intractable in private chill cases. Of course, the justifications for
judicial review are an inexhaustible source of disputation, 69 but my
point is a narrower one: the legitimacy of the courts' exercise of
judicial review is at an especially low ebb in situations where, as in
private chill cases, a court reviews a legislative resolution of a conflict
among the constitutional interests of private parties and there is no
apparent violation of constitutional norms.170
When a court overturns a statute in a private chill situationan act that inherently favors one private party's exercise of
constitutional freedoms over another's-the legislature has not
trespassed constitutional norms such that the court must interpose its
jurisdiction as a shield against suppression. Instead, the court is
simply shifting the constitutional burden from one private party to
another. There are serious questions regarding the institutional
competence of courts to perform such a role.17 1
For example, a disclosure policy will generally require the
policymaker to strike an appropriate balance between privacy and free
speech interests, on the one hand, and the First Amendment
prerogatives of the press, activists, and the electorate-at-large on the
other. It is unclear why a court enforcing constitutional rights should
have a privileged perspective regarding the propriety of such a
tradeoff: "The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information
Act nor an Official Secrets Act."172 Thus, the Court has repeatedly
169. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Counter-MajoritarianProblem and the Pathology of
Constitutional Scholarship,95 Nw. U. L. REV. 933, 935 (2001).
170. Fallon, supra note 168, at 1731.
171. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 141, at 888; Jeremy Waldron, The Core Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1349 (2006). As a number of commentators have noted, a
court's purview is necessarily constrained: courts are "forced to consider only the information and
claims that are placed directly before them." Scott Barclay & Thomas Birkland, Law,
Policymaking, and the Policy Process: Closing the Gaps, 26 POL'Y STUD. J. 227, 324 (1998);
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1993).
172. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). As Richard Briffault has recently argued
in the campaign finance context,
[the Court] has no greater constitutional authority and no greater political legitimacy
than Congress or state or local legislatures in making the trade-offs and weighing and
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emphasized that, despite the fact that the tradeoff between
transparency and privacy will inevitably impinge upon the exercise of
some protected rights, "[tihe choice as to the most effective and
appropriate model [of disclosure] is a policy decision to be resolved by
a legislative decision."173 In Doe, for instance, the state of Washington
could have chosen to have no disclosure of initiative-petition
signatories, and, had such a policy decision been made, R-71
protesters would not have been able to base a constitutional claim on
their inability to access information. 174 The same principle would
apply to any number of legislative resolutions along the spectrum from
privacy to transparency, including exemptions from disclosure or
access-and-use restrictions for disclosed information. 75 Alternatively,
the legislature could have chosen to outlaw a wider category of private
harassing and retaliatory actions.176
balancing the respective roles of free speech, political participation, voter information,
competitive elections, voter equality, government integrity, and elected official timeprotection in determining campaign finance law.
Richard Briffault, On DejudicializingAmerican Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
887, 924 (2011).
173. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 13.
174. LAPD v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1999) (denying facial
challenge by private publishing service that had provided personal information of recently
arrested individuals to its clients to statute limiting commercial users' access to such
information); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15 (holding that neither first nor fourteenth amendment
mandates a right to information or sources of information within the government's control.). But
see Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) ("This Court has held that the creation
and dissemination of information is speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.").
175. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2012) (disallowing
commercial use of disclosed information regarding campaign contributions); Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (listing nine privacy-based exemptions to Freedom of
Information Act); see also Kreimer, supra note 53, at 123 n.327 (listing federal statutes that
place limitations on broad disclosure of information about individuals). Kreimer argues that
constitutional concerns mandate that such disclosure limitations be broadly construed. Solove,
supra note 11, at 1165-72 (listing federal and state access and use restrictions for public records
acts); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
770 (1989) (construing broadly FOIA privacy exemption in light of constitutional concern with
"threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks").
176. Many of the private acts of retaliation feared by the R-71 signatories, such as harassing
threats and employment retaliation, were already outlawed under Washington law. See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.680(2) (2004) (prohibiting employers from retaliating against
employees for political speech); § 9A.46.020 (defining criminal harassment as extending to
threats of bodily injury, property damage, or other harm to physical or mental health or safety).
Approximately half of Americans live in jurisdictions which protect some employee speech or
political activity against private employer retaliation. See generally Eugene Volokh, Private

Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory ProtectionAgainst Employer Retaliation, 16
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295 (2012). Obviously, such criminal acts as assaults, death threats, and
vandalism are already outlawed.
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Of course, a court should assess the facial validity of such a
legislative action under the appropriate form of balancing analysis
and should also determine whether a seemingly neutral state action in
reality cloaked invidious motivation or other constitutional
infirmity.177 But once a legislature strikes a policy resolution that
generally passes facial constitutional muster, a separation of powers
problem results when a court upsets this resolution through an asapplied challenge or another judicially created exception in a private
chill scenario.178
The legitimacy of a court's intervention is on firm ground
where the court is shielding constitutional liberties against state
incursions-a negative-rights function. But in the absence of such a
negative-rights role, it is hard to understand why a positive-rights
account of chilling effect theory should justify intervention, especially
when it is unclear that intervening would, in fact, result in a net gain
to public discourse. 179
A related judicial-unilateralism problem would still exist even
if the private actions causing the chilling effect did not consist of
speech or some other constitutionally preferred value but still
comprised legal, private activities. For example, in the wake of the
revelation that TD Ameritrade founder Joe Ricketts was planning to
spend millions to finance advertisements attacking President Obama,
multiple TD Ameritrade customers closed their brokerage accounts
with the company. 8 A court would be unlikely to find that such
account closings, absent any accompanying expressive component, are
constitutionally protected speech. But if a court were to take it upon
177. Kreimer, supra note 53, at 23; Note, supranote 6, at 882.
178. Such judicially created exceptions are as much state action as the underlying statute
would be. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 797 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[A]n injunction against speech is the very prototype of the greatest threat to First
Amendment values, the prior restraint."); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)
("[P]ermanent injunctions, i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities, are classic
examples of prior restraints.").
A growing number of commentators have argued that judicial review is particularly
normatively problematic in as-applied challenges, severability situations, and other instances of
court-created exceptions to otherwise valid laws. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and
Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 958 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial
Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 885 (2005); Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S.

Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied
Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1653
(2009). Like as-applied challenges and severability, private chill cases require a court to fashion
a policy compromise that no democratically elected actor either proposed or ratified.
179. Dorf, supra note 44, at 1144.
180. Jim Rutenberg & Jeff Zeleny, Magnate Steps into 2012 Fray on Wild Pitch, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2012, at Al.
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itself to enjoin such account closings to prevent a chilling effect upon
Mr. Ricketts' political spending, clear judicial-unilateralism problems
would result. Were Mr. Ricketts to seek an as-applied exemption to
disclosure laws to prevent such a chilling effect on his spending, 18 the
practical effect would be the same as enjoining the customers from
closing the accounts-private customers would be deprived of
information pertinent to their investment decisions, so the account
closings would not take place.
In private chill situations such as Doe, there has often been no
determination by any source of law that the potentially deterrent
actions are illegal. Yet the court is asked to block such actions from
occurring. The question then becomes under what circumstances is a
court justified in acting to prevent the private exercise of legal or even
constitutionally protected third-party prerogatives?
C. Private Chill as Accommodation
As I have argued in the previous sections, it is difficult to
justify a private chill claim as a negative-rights claim since the state is
not trespassing constitutional limits. Nor can one justify a private
chill claim in positive-rights terms since there is no reason to believe
that extending chilling effect protections to private chill claims will
necessarily advance First Amendment values. But if a private chill
claim is neither a negative-rights claim nor a positive-rights claim,
what kind of claim is it? In other words, what is the source of the
mandate for judicial intervention in private chill cases?
A private chill claim can perhaps best be conceptualized as a
request for accommodation: an argument that a court should
accommodate the exercise of a speaker's First Amendment rights,
even at the expense of the preexisting prerogatives of a private
party.182 Accordingly, the essence of a private chill claim can be
181. As it happens, the particular proposed expenditures at issue would not have been
subject to current disclosure requirements, since the expenditures were made through a
nonprofit group. Instead, Mr. Ricketts is reported to have voluntarily disclosed his contributions
to the group and his intentions for the expenditures. Amanda Terkel, The One-Person Funded
Super PAC: How Wealthy Donors Can Skirt Campaign FinanceRestrictions, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 25, 2011, 7:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/21/super-pac-taxpayersearmarks-concerned-citizens-campaign-finance-n_772214.html.
182. For a general discussion of the problems of legal baselines in arguments regarding state
action and positive and negative rights, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 874 (1987) (arguing that the defining error of the Lochner era was an understanding of
state action in which governmental neutrality and inaction "were defined as respect for the
behavior of private actors pursuant to the common law, in light of the existing distribution of
wealth and entitlements').

2013]

THE CHILLING EFFECT & PRIVATE ACTION

1517

described as follows. Private party A claims that the anticipated
actions of private party B deter A's exercise of a protected right. A
therefore requests that the court grant prospective relief that will
prevent B's action.
Thus, a private chill claim shares the same structure as a
request for an injunction or other court-created prohibition against the
allegedly chilling private behavior. The differences are in the parties
sued and in the relief sought. In an as-applied challenge, such as in
Doe, the state is the defendant and the relief A requests is an
individual exemption from a state regulation that forms a necessary
precondition for B's action. In a request by A for an injunction, the
source of deterrence is the direct target of the suit: the defendant is
private party B and the requested relief is the prohibition of B's
anticipated action.
In private chill cases, a judicially created as-applied exception
is the functional equivalent of a prohibition of the private party's
alleged chilling behavior. 183 Such an as-applied challenge therefore
functions as a substitute for a direct prohibition against the third
party. In a way, then, the state acts somewhat like a litigation proxy
for the real source of deterrence in private chill as-applied
challenges-private party B. This is especially so when B is
sufficiently difficult to identify with particularity that a suit directly
against B is impracticable. One can think of state action in such cases
as enabling A to bring suit against a state actor "upstream" in the
causal progression of the challenged activity.
For example, in Doe, the asserted injury that plaintiffs sought
judicial intervention to prevent-the threat of identification,
reporting, confrontations, accusations, picketing, and politically
motivated boycotts-comprised largely activities that themselves
carried a high degree of speech value. The judicial grant of an asapplied harassment exemption would thus remove a significant
amount of information from public discourse and would itself
significantly distort political speech. A court's grant of a harassment
exemption from the state ballot-initiative disclosure law to the Doe
plaintiffs in order to prevent them from being chilled by third-party
action would have the same effect as the grant of an injunction against
the R-71-initative protesters. Either way, the protestors would be
precluded from engaging in a wide range of activities with respect to
the R-71 signers, either individually or in the aggregate-identifying
them, contacting them, writing about them, protesting against them,
183. Marshall, supra note 45, at 1953; Stone, supranote 44, at 68.
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or boycotting them. Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts framed the asapplied challenge in Doe, such an exemption could potentially extend
not only to the R-71 signatories, but also to petitions for any
controversial ballot initiative as well.184
Had the R-71 signatories requested an injunction directly
against the source of chill-that is, against the particular advocacy
groups who had requested and were planning to publish the
information regarding the petition signatories-the First Amendment
would have barred such relief. 185 Even were such an injunction
somehow deemed constitutionally acceptable, the R-71 signatories
would still have had to demonstrate irreparable injury and other
prospective-relief requirements in order to demonstrate their
entitlement to an injunction. 86 But because the R-71 signatories
instead brought their lawsuit in the form of an as-applied challenge
against the state, neither the First Amendment nor traditional
limitations on equitable remedies posed any obstacles to plaintiffs'
request.
My point in bringing up these discrepancies is not to argue that
a speaker must bring a private chill case as a direct suit against the
private source of chill rather than as an as-applied challenge against
an enabling governmental action. Such a mandate would foreclose the
valuable upstream role that such as-applied challenges allow. In
private chill cases, the normal processes of private-law adjudicationincluding both prospective injunctions and post hoc remediation-may
be inadequate to redress First Amendment injuries. After all, it will
rarely be possible to identify in advance potential harassers or other
malefactors in order for preliminary injunctive relief to be effective.
Similarly, post hoc remediation, such as damages or reinstatement to
an unjustly terminated job, addresses only consequences that actually
materialize, not the deterrent effect of the threat itself. The threat of
184. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820-21 (2010) (characterizing the as-applied issue as
"whether ... disclosure violates the First Amendment with respect to those who signed the R-71
petition, or other particularly controversial petitions").
185. Courts have generally rejected requests that private parties be barred from publishing
lawfully obtained information. See, e.g., Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12
(1977) (finding unconstitutional a state court's pretrial order enjoining the media from
publishing the name or photograph of an eleven-year-old boy in connection with a juvenile
proceeding involving that child which reporters had attended).
186. FED. R. Crv. P. 65. For example, to obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must ordinarily
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury, (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury, (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted,
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. See, e.g., eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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violence or other wrongdoing can create a substantial chilling effect
regardless of whether the threat is actually carried out. Thus, in at
least some private chill cases, an upstream solution seems desirable.
But understanding a private chill claim as a request for
accommodation, rather than as a negative- or positive-rights claim,
allows us to set appropriate limits upon the scope and consequences of
accommodation. Courts have generally tended to be unsympathetic to
requests for accommodation, especially where the accommodation
would arguably be at the expense of third-party prerogatives.1 8 7 Even
if speech is considered to be a "preferred value,"188 a speaker is not
generally entitled to a constitutionally compelled exemption from an
otherwise valid law merely because the speaker can demonstrate that
the law would have particularly harsh consequences when applied to
her situation.189 First Amendment law, in short, fails to provide a
mandate for judicial intervention in private chill cases.
But looking outside the First Amendment context, we can find
models for judicial intervention in cases where a court has granted
equitable relief to obviate a chilling effect arising from private action.
In these cases, the chilled right did not stem from the First
Amendment, but the structure of the claim was the same: party A
187. In "private forum" cases, for example, courts have generally denied speakers' requests
that they be able to use private property to enable their exercise of First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding
privately owned St. Patrick's Day parade need not include gay organization); Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976) (rejecting claim that exclusion of labor picketers from private shopping mall
violated First Amendment). PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), is arguably
an exception to private forum doctrine. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of a state constitutional provision to guarantee speakers access
to a privately owned shopping center. However, PruneYard did not turn upon a freestanding
First Amendment right of access to private property, but was contingent upon the California
constitution's recognition of a positive free speech right. See Lillian R. BeVier, Give and Take:
Public Use as Due Compensation in PruneYard, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 71-72 (1997); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 21 (1997) (arguing that the law upheld in PruneYard does not serve any
constitutionally valid public "use" or interest); Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline

and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 57
(1997) (arguing that the state law in PruneYard should not be considered a taking because it
merely offsets a harm to an important public interest that the mall operation would otherwise be
causing).
Similarly, courts have generally invalidated laws that require privately owned means of
mass communication to accommodate opposing viewpoints, except where such mass
communication is held only as a result of governmental grant. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). But see
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding "must carry" provisions for cable
operators); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC "fairness doctrine").
188. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 6, at 705.
189. See supranotes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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claimed that the anticipated actions of private party B chilled A's
exercise of a protected right and requested judicial intervention to
prevent B's action. In resolving these disputes, courts adopted what I
call an "accommodation" approach, as I explain in the next Part.
Rather than focusing on preventing a chilling effect, courts following
an accommodation approach instead focused their intervention on
preventing irreparable injury arising from illegal action.
V. PRIVATE CHILL MODELS OF ACCOMMODATION

As a starting point for a model to resolve private chill claims, I
look at cases in which a party requested judicial intervention to
prevent a chilling effect arising from private action, including from
activity that itself was constitutionally protected. In many of the cases
in this line, the chilled right was not a First Amendment right but
another right of constitutional significance. For example, in the
Lochner era, courts considered economic rights, such as freedom of
contract, to be of paramount constitutional significance and were
unsympathetic to labor regulations that might chill the free exercise of
economic rights. In more modern cases, the chilled right has involved
the exercise of reproductive freedom.
Although the substance of the chilled right has changed over
the decades, the structure of the accommodation approach has
remained the same. Courts have used this approach to resolve private
chill claims in a line of cases dating back to the labor injunction
controversies of the early twentieth century. The development of this
approach in private chill situations tracks the federal courts' struggle
over the past century to reach some principled resolution regarding
the proper scope of their equitable powers.190
The accommodation approach has two basic characteristics.
First, the court does not view its role as protecting one party against a
chilling effect. As I have explained, such an approach would assume
that the plaintiff is the only party with constitutionally salient
interests in the case, an assumption that generally does not hold true
in private chill cases. Instead, the court employing an accommodation
190. Equity, for nineteenth-century American lawyers, was an English import that, from its
origins at Chancery, carried a connotation of unbounded judicial discretion. It thus fit uneasily
within the American federal judicial framework of limited jurisdiction and separation of powers.
GARY L. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF,

AND PUBLIC POLICY 30-31 (1982); Gene R. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public Interest, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 383 (1983). Despite these concerns, equity was deemed essential to add
flexibility where an overly rigid application of legal rules would work injustice. Chayes, supra
note 56, at 1292.
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approach views its role as protecting against irreparable injury arising
from illegal conduct, especially violence.
Second, the accommodation approach is more deferential to
legislative resolution of competing rights claims than a negative-rights
or positive-rights approach would require. It is not the role of the court
to provide a remedy where no legal right is violated.' 9 ' Instead, the
accommodation approach is common law in nature, sensitive to the
contours of existing law and subject to legislative revision.192
A. The Labor Injunction Cases
The labor injunction cases of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries provide a useful model for the analysis of presentday private chill cases. In these cases, the courts considered disputes
that were structurally similar to private chill cases such as Doe. The
typical labor injunction case involved private party A (the employer)
seeking judicial intervention to prevent the anticipated actions of
another private party B (various forms of agitation by workers and
labor activists). Private party A would claim that B's action would
deter A's exercise of a protected right (freedom of contract or a related
economic right).
In resolving such disputes, Lochner-era courts at first adopted
an approach analogous to a chilling effect theory: they broadly
enjoined any labor activity-whether legal or illegal-that was likely
191. This aspect of the approach derives from the equitable maxim aequitas sequitur legem,
or equity follows the law-a tenet which Justice Story once described as the most important in
equity jurisprudence. MCDOWELL, supra note 190, at 30-31 (1982). This tenet required that a
court acting in equity should tailor its decrees to the substantive law. The emphasis placed on
the principle of aequitas sequitur legem in American equitable jurisprudence might have
reflected the extent to which this maxim is congruent with separation of powers concerns. Id. at
108; Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 661, 674 (1978).
For an early articulation of this principle, see Rees v. Watertown, 86 U.S. 107, 122
(1873) ("A court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a right but no remedy known to the
law, create a remedy in violation of law, or even without the authority of law. It acts upon
established principles not only, but through established channels."). This principle has been
incorporated into general equity practice: under general equity principles, an injunction issues
only if there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or imminently will violate, some
provision of statutory or common law, and that there is a "cognizable danger of recurrent
violation." United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
192. Eugene Volokh has argued for a somewhat comparable approach in assessing claims for
religious exemptions from otherwise valid laws. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999). Professor Volokh argues that state-law
analogues to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act should follow a "common-law exemption"
approach in which exemption decisions are initially made by courts but are ultimately revisable
by legislatures. Id. at 1481.
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to deter an employer's exercise of economic rights. This approach
sparked widespread criticism of "government by injunction." 193 Critics
charged judges with abusing their equitable powers by forbidding
otherwise legal activity.
With the onset of the New Deal, however, the courts began to
change course, adopting limits on their equitable powers and crafting
an accommodation approach. Under this approach, the court tailored
equitable relief to protect against irreparable injury arising from
illegal private retribution instead of attempting to stop one party's
rights from deterring another's.
1. "Government by Injunction"
The rise of the American labor movement in the mid- to late
nineteenth century generated worker agitation of increasing breadth,
sophistication, and impact. 194 Labor's new tactics included general
strikes involving tens or even hundreds of thousands of workers,
consumer boycotts and blacklists, and targeted picketing that, at
times, included threatened or actual violence.195 In seeking judicial
relief from these practices, employers invoked what we would
recognize as a chilling effect-like theory, although the chilled right at
issue was not generally speech, but instead was often an economic
right, such as freedom of contract. Typically, employers would claim
that these practices constituted threats, intimidation, and coercion
that deterred them from exercising these economic rights.
Prior to the New Deal, courts responding to such complaints
would commonly grant broad injunctive relief in the form of blanket
injunctions. Notably, these blanket injunctions did not distinguish
between legal and illegal labor practices, enjoining not only violent or
threatening activity, but also peaceable labor activism, such as
193. See, e.g., Charles Noble Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARV. L. REV. 487, 487
(1898).
194. See generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991); FELIx FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1963).
195. FORBATH, supra note 194, at 79-83; Brendan D. Cummins, Note, The Thorny Path to

Thornhill: The Origins at Equity of the Free Speech Overbreadth Doctrine, 105 YALE L.J. 1671,
1672 (1996).
One dramatic example was the Pullman Strike of 1894, which involved as many as
250,000 workers in twenty-seven states, and brought railroad traffic across the nation to a halt.
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 194, at 18; DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE: THE
CLASH OF LABOR AND CAPITAL IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 35-37 (1999). See generally, ALMONT
LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE (1942). The strike ended when the federal courts granted the
railroads' requests for injunctions against the strikers, and federal troops were sent in to enforce
the terms of the injunctions.
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publishing boycott lists, parading, and applying "opprobrious
epithets." 196 For example, in the Danbury Hatters case, Loewe v.
Lawlor,1'97 the Supreme Court held that the hatters union had violated
both the Sherman Act and common law principles where the union
had used newspapers and union publications to urge consumers to
boycott a supplier's nonunion goods. 98 Similarly, in Gompers v. Buck's
Stove & Range Co.,1 99 the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge
to an injunction prohibiting defendants from boycotting the plaintiffbusiness and from publishing or stating that the business employed
unfair labor practices. Indeed, the Court reasoned that there was no
meaningful distinction between labor action that took the form of
"verbal acts" and "any other force whereby property is unlawfully
damaged." 200 Over the course of the Gilded Age, courts issued
thousands of such blanket injunctions, 201 which became the primary
legal mechanism for the regulation of labor. 202
Contemporary legal critics of this "government by injunction"203
pointed out that the same equitable doctrines used to extend judicial

196. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 326 (1921).
197. 208 U.S. 274 (1908); see also FORBATH, supra note 194, at 91-93.
198. At first, judges based this new equitable power on property law, specifically the
"'indubitable authority' of 'ancient times' . . . derived from cases involving equitable jurisdiction
over nuisances." Charles Noble Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARV. L. REV. 487, 488
(1898); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Law: The
Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70 (1960). Later, in an ironic twist on
"trust-busting," industry lawyers convinced federal courts that the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890 was enforceable against organized labor, so that strikes and other labor protests could be
treated as an illegal restraint of trade and accordingly enjoined. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra
note 194, at 8-9; FORBATH, supra note 194, at 96; see also Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 438 (1911) (holding that the Sherman Act covers any restraint of trade "whether
the restraint be occasioned by unlawful contracts, trusts, pooling arrangements, blacklists,
boycotts, coercion, threats, intimidation, and whether these be made effective, in whole or in
part, by acts, words, or printed matter").
199. 221 U.S. at 418.
200. Id. at 439.
201. FORBATH, supra note 194, at 61 (estimating that at least 4,300 such injunctions were
issued between 1880 and 1930); see also FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 194, at 97 (offering
catalogue of blanket labor injunctions issued prior to the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914);
Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 832 (1925) (estimating that such
blanket clauses occurred in over half of labor injunctions).
During this period, strikes to improve wages and working conditions had long been legal
under the common law, and no statutes prohibited labor's new tactics so long as such tactics
steered clear of violence and other criminal acts. FORBATH, supranote 194, at 104; FRANKFURTER
& GREENE, supra note 194, at 200; Cummins, supra note 195, at 1673-74.
202. MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 45 (6th ed.

2007).
203. See Gregory, supra note 193, at 488.
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power also set limits on the exercise of that power. 20 4 By ignoring
those limits, courts were assuming unbounded discretion and,
according to these critics, were engaging in judicial lawmaking. 205 As
then-Professor Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene wrote in their
classic treatise The Labor Injunction, "As to labor controversies during
the last quarter-century, equity in America has absorbed the law." 20 6
At first, disputes between employment and labor were purely
private law disputes, but as the Gilded Age wore on, economic rights
against labor agitation took on constitutional dimensions. 207 Congress
and state legislatures began to push back against perceived judicial
excesses by passing a series of anti-injunction statutes, most notably
the Clayton Act of 1914. These anti-injunction statutes tried to
immunize certain forms of peaceful labor agitation from judicial
injunctions.
Many courts responded to this legislative pushback by
awarding constitutional status to employers' interests in the economic
status quo. The courts reasoned that if picketing (or other labor
activism) had previously been enjoined as interfering with employers'
economic rights, then employers could have a substantive due process
right in the availability of an antipicketing injunction-a due process
right that the anti-injunction statute might violate by immunizing
picketing from injunctions.
For example, in Truax v. Corrigan, a five-justice majority
declared unconstitutional an Arizona anti-injunction statute that
closely tracked the terms of section 20 of the Clayton Act.208 The Court
reasoned that by permitting previously enjoined picketing, the law
"deprives the owner of the business and the premises of his property
without due process, and cannot be held valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 209 Similarly, in the notorious case of Hitchman Coal &
204. Such limits included the principle of aequitas sequitur legem as well as such familiar
equitable limitations as the requirement of irreparable injury and the tenet that equity would
not enjoin the conduct of innocent parties. FORBATH, supra note 194, at 62; FRANKFURTER &
GREENE, supra note 194, at 201; Gregory, supranote 193, at 502.
205. Gregory, supra note 193, at 502 (comparing the Court's use of the equitable injunction
in this period to "criminal legislation").
206. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 194, at 47.
207. FORBATH, supra note 194, at 87-88; Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and
Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 306 (1994).
208. 257 U.S. 312, 341 (1921).
209. Id. at 328; see also Currie, supra note 142, at 876. However, in American Steel
Foundries v. Ti-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), which was argued and
decided within a few days of Truax, the Court upheld a requested antipicketing injunction
against a union that had engaged in occasionally violent agitation but eliminated the word
"persuasion" from the order, since persuasion was deemed "lawful" activity.
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Coke Co. v. Mitchell,210 union organizing "was enjoined as an
infringement of the operators' 'property interest' in the nonunion
status of their miners." 211 The Court deemed this right against labor
interference with an ongoing business to be part of business owners'
"constitutional rights of personal liberty and private property." 212
Gilded Age courts increasingly assumed that industrial interests had
a constitutionally protected property interest in status quo contractual
arrangements and entitlements, and any regulatory efforts to dislodge
these arrangements were presumptively suspect. 213
2. Frankfurter and the Foundations of Accommodation
With the onset of the New Deal, courts began to change course,
responding to increased popular and legislative criticism of the
excesses of labor injunctions. In 1932, Congress passed the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 214 championed and partially drafted by Professor
Frankfurter. 215 The Act substantially restricted the use of the labor
injunction in all but a few limited circumstances, prohibiting federal
courts from issuing injunctions in nonviolent labor disputes, including
strikes, picketing, and publicizing the facts of a labor dispute. 216 By
the time the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
first came before the Court, 217 the New Deal Majority had supplanted
the Lochner Court.
At the same time, courts increasingly began to recognize that
labor's right to organize and to engage in peaceable activism was a
right of constitutional dimensions. 218 Only a few weeks after the
Court's historic "switch in time" in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,219 and
by the same majority, the Court in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective
Union, Local No. 5220 first recognized, albeit in dicta, that the First
210. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
211. FORBATH, supra note 194, at 115; see Hitchman Coal, 245 U.S. at 251.
212. 245 U.S. at 251.
213. Thus, the labor injunction cases exhibit what Cass Sunstein has argued was the
defining error of the Lochner era-the tendency to treat an existing distribution of common-law
property entitlements as a neutral baseline, for constitutional purposes. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, supra note 182, at 882.
214. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
101-10. 113-15 (2012)).
215. FORBATH, supra note 194, at 161.
216. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932).
217. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
218. Cummins, supra note 195, at 1672.
219. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
220. 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
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Amendment protected the rights of workers and unions to publicize
the facts of a labor dispute through picketing. 221 Soon afterwards, in
Thornhill v. Alabama,222 the Court elevated this dictum to the status
of First Amendment doctrine, striking down an antipicketing statute
on the grounds that such activity is speech protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
But the recognition of the constitutionally protected status of
much labor activism did not mean that the courts withdrew from the
task of protecting employers and nonunionized employees from the
outbreaks of violence and illegality that sometimes stemmed from
labor agitation. Instead, courts began to develop an accommodation
approach recognizing that both union members and business owners
had constitutional interests at stake in these struggles.
This new approach used the courts' equitable powers to craft
flexible remedies that could protect parties against irreparable injury
resulting from unlawful actions. But, unlike the previous generation of
blanket labor injunctions, the courts did not attempt to shield parties
from any and all actions that might chill their economic rights.
Instead, the courts attempted to disentangle legal "intimidation" and
"coercion" (that resulting from protected speech) from illegal
intimidation and coercion (that resulting from violence or other
illegality). Only the latter was deemed a proper subject for the court's
equitable powers.
In Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Milk Wagon Drivers Union
v. Meadowmoor Dairies,223 we can discern the beginnings of this
accommodation approach. In Meadowmoor, the plaintiff-dairy sought
an injunction against the defendant-union from allegedly conspiring to
reduce sales of the plaintiffs products by picketing stores and by using
violence and other unlawful acts. The record in Meadowmoor
demonstrated far more than "episodic or isolated"224 incidents of
violence-on more than fifty occasions, union supporters had resorted
to explosive bombs, severe beatings, shootings, and arson. 225 The
Court affirmed the injunction but limited it to conduct occurring near

221. Id. at 478 ("Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a
state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution.").
222. 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
223. 312 U.S. 287, 296 (1941).
224. Id. at 295.
225. Id. at 291-92, 295.
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stores selling plaintiffs milk and noted that the injunction could be
modified once there was no longer "a continuing intimidation."226
Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter-the archcritic of
the labor injunction and a primary drafter of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act-authored the decision upholding the requested injunction.227
Although the scope of the injunction eventually upheld in
Meadowmoor was nearly as broad as the previous era's labor
injunctions had been, Frankfurter's reasoning in Meadowmoor broke
with the Lochner generation of courts, instead displaying the
hallmarks of an accommodation approach.
First, Frankfurter's reasoning demonstrated significant
deference to both legislative determinations and the constitutional
prerogatives of labor activists. Frankfurter continually emphasized
the common-law nature of the equitable relief at issue, repeatedly
reaffirming the state legislature's ability to limit the courts' equitable
powers. 228
Second, Frankfurter viewed the courts' role as attempting to
craft a remedy that could protect against illegal violence and coercion.
By contrast, Lochner-era courts had viewed their mandate as a
broader effort to insulate employers from any labor activism that
might chill their economic rights. 229
But Frankfurter also pointed out that, in order to fashion
effective protection against future violence, a court may have to
extend its injunctive powers to reach some activity that is legal, in
addition to merely enjoining illegal activity. 230 Under the
circumstances of this particular dispute, a storekeeper observing
picketing around his store would understand such picketing to convey

226. Id. at 298.
227. Reading the opinion, one can sense Frankfurter's defensiveness in this role, especially
given the dissents of three Justices-Black, Douglas, and Reed-who deemed the injunction to
violate constitutional rights by including peaceable persuasion within its scope. In emphasizing
the limited reach of the challenged injunction, which was limited "to conduct near stores dealing
in respondents milk," id. at 298, Frankfurter even invoked Justice Cardozo as a role model: "An
injunction so adjusted to a particular situation is in accord with the settled practice of equity,
sanctioned by such guardians of civil liberty as Mr. Justice Cardozo." Id. (citing Nann v. Raimist,
174 N.E. 690 (1931)).
228. Id. at 295, 298.
229. See, e.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (refusing to
differentiate between verbal acts and other, illegal forms of intimidation).
230. I refer to a court's limitation of legal activity for the purpose of preventing illegal
activity as the "buffer zone" approach, for reasons that will become clearer as we discuss the
abortion clinic cases, infra Part V.B.
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a threat of violence. 231 Therefore, although peaceful picketing is
ordinarily protected, in this case, there were special reasons to allow
injunctive relief to extend to legal activity: "[T]he power to deny what
otherwise would be lawful picketing derives from the power of the
states to prevent future coercion." 232
Frankfurter was careful to point out that such an inference
should not apply to any situation in which sporadic acts of violence
have occurred: "[The r]ight to free speech in the future cannot be
forfeited because of dissociated acts of past violence." 2 33 The Court
viewed its task, then, as crafting a solution that protects against
illegal conduct yet avoids encroaching on the "[r]ight to free speech in
the future" by "drawing from a trivial rough incident or a moment of
animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing
has the taint of force." 234 Such an inquiry inevitably involves searching
review of the factual record. 235
Moreover, Frankfurter noted that "in the exceptional cases
warranting restraint upon normally free conduct, the restraint ought
to be defined by clear and guarded language" that, optimally, the court
itself should draft. 236 Thus, Frankfurter, crusader against labor
injunctions and perennial champion of judicial restraint, envisioned
an active role for the courts in tailoring carefully crafted remedies that
would respect legislative and private prerogatives while still
safeguarding protected speech against the threat of illegal activity.
B. Modern Accommodation Cases
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Meadowmoor laid the
foundations for the accommodation approach in private chill cases, but
courts did not follow this approach with any degree of consistency. 237

231. As Frankfurter observes: "The picketing in this case was set in a background of
violence. In such a setting it could justifiably be concluded that the momentum of fear generated
by past violence would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful."

Meadowmoor, 221 U.S. at 294.
232. Id. at 296.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 293, 296.
235. Id. at 293.
236. Id. at 296.
237. In the labor-law context, for example, later generations of courts showed a troubling
tendency to revert to Lochner-like premises, reifying common-law property rights against
legislative modification at the expense of the speech rights of activists and organizers. See, e.g.,
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992) (forbidding nonemployee union organizers
from soliciting union support on private property except where no reasonable alternatives exist);
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On the public law side, the Buckley Court articulated the harassment
exemption, which gave short shrift to the responsive speech of
activists and protesters by failing to distinguish between
governmental and private sources of chill. On the private law side, a
line of cases following Meadowmoor continued the tradition of
accommodation into the modern era. These cases deepened and
refined the accommodation approach along the lines that Frankfurter
mapped out.
1. ClaiborneHardware
Like the dispute in Meadowmoor-and like the feared
harassment in Doe-the factual situation in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardwarecomprised a mix of legal and illegal private chilling actions:
"elements of criminality and elements of majesty." 238 White merchants
who had been the target of a civil rights boycott sued the boycott
participants and organizers, including the NAACP, for malicious
interference with business and other state-law tort claims. The
NAACP had organized the boycott in protest of white elected officials'
refusal to meet demands for racial equality and integration.
The organizers employed a range of tactics to support the
boycott. Some of these tactics were relatively innocuous, such as
protest marches and peaceful picketing. Others, however, were more
aggressive, as the organizers attempted to "discipline" members of the
black community who continued to patronize white-owned businesses.
Boycott violators "were branded as traitors to the black cause, called
demeaning names, and socially ostracized for merely trading with
whites." 2 39 Most problematic was the appointment of "store watchers"
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (denying that First Amendment protection would
entitle union members to strike inside a private shopping mall).
238. 458 U.S. 886, 888 (1982); see also Michael C. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right
to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and its Implications for American Labor Law, 93
YALE L.J. 409, 410-13 (1984) (describing the case in greater detail); Theresa J. Lee,
Democratizing the Economic Sphere: A Case for the Political Boycott, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 531
(2012) (summarizing political-boycott case law and comparing it to recent development in
campaign finance doctrine); Elian Dashev, Note, Economic Boycotts as Harassment: The Threat
to FirstAmendment Protected Speech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed, 45 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 207,
208 (2011) (reviewing key rulings on economic boycotts, and specifically focusing on Doe v. Reed).
Notably, in the oral argument in Doe v. Reed, Justice Kennedy chided petitioners' attorney
James Bopp for failing to cite Claiborne Hardware.Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, 3839, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559). Kennedy asked if any boycott or picket by
the R-71 opponents itself was "a First Amendment activity," so that "the signers' interest in
keeping their names private would be somewhat diminished." Id. Neither side's advocate
provided a substantive response. Id.
239. ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 904.

1530

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:5:1473

known as the "Black Hats" or "Deacons," who stationed themselves
outside white-owned businesses and recorded the names of black
customers who traded with white merchants. Names of these boycott
violators were read aloud at meetings of the Claiborne County NAACP
and published in a mimeographed paper called the "Black Times." At
times, such retaliatory acts spilled over into threats and actual
incidents of violence. 240 Boycott violators were beaten, had shots fired
at their houses, had their tires slashed, and were the victims of other
acts of vandalism. 241
Although members of the black community who had violated
the boycott were not parties to the suit, the Court was understandably
concerned with crafting a remedy that would forestall the illegal
violence and harassment directed at boycott violators. These boycott
violators, too, had expressive interests at stake in the conflict: if a
boycott is deemed protected speech, then a fortiori the decision not to
participate-or not to be coerced into participating-in a political
boycott also has expressive value. 24 2
The state court found a severe chilling effect upon the
expressive and associational freedoms of black boycott violators: "[T]he
volition of many black persons was overcome out of sheer fear, and
they were forced and compelled against their personal wills to
withhold their trade and business intercourse from the
complainants." 243 The state court reasoned that both the legal and
illegal elements of the boycott campaign had contributed to the
"atmosphere of fear that prevailed among blacks from 1966 until
1970."244 Accordingly, the state court did not attempt to disaggregate
the effects of the legal and illegal actions of the boycott organizers.
Instead, the Court found all 130 defendants liable for the judgment of
$1.25 million and issued a broad injunction, forbidding defendants
from stationing "store watchers" at plaintiffs' premises, from
"persuading" any person to withhold his patronage, from "using
demeaning and obscene language to or about any person" because of
240. For example, in announcing the boycott, Charles Evers, one of the boycott leaders, told
the black community that any "uncle toms" who violated the boycott would " 'have their necks
broken' by their own people." Id. at 900 n.28. Other boycott violators received personal threats,
either over the telephone or in person. Id. at 904 n.37, 906.
241. Id. at 903-06.
242. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 782 (1988) ("[Tihe First
Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both
what to say and what not to say."); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("Freedom
of association . .. plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.").
243. ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 894-95.
244. Id. at 904.
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the boycott, from "picketing or patrolling" the plaintiffs' premises, and
from using violence or inflicting damage to any person or property. 245
Thus, the state-court injunction extended to illegal violence and
vandalism as well as to protected speech and activism.
In a decision issued in the same year as Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Committee, discussed supra, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that the damages award and
injunction went too far since they extended to the nonviolent elements
of the protest that the First Amendment protected. 246 The Court
acknowledged that the First Amendment does not protect violent
activity but rejected the argument that the overall thrust of the
politically motivated boycott could be "characterized as a violent
conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of
relatively few violent acts."247 The Court continued:
The burden of demonstrating that fear, rather than protected conduct, was the
dominant force in the movement is heavy. A court must be wary of a claim that the true
color of a forest is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of
24 8
countless freestanding trees.

Thus, even though both lawful and unlawful conduct were
arguably part of the same enterprise in Claiborne Hardware and both
contributed to the chilling "atmosphere of fear," the Court was only
empowered to remedy the portion of deterrence that arose from illegal,
rather than legal, acts. 249 Rather than relying on "insubstantial
findings of fact screening reality,"250 the Court's task was to engage in
a searching review of the factual record in order to distinguish the
"reptiles" from the "forest."251
Accordingly, relying heavily on the accommodation approach
outlined in Meadowmoor, the ClaiborneHardwareCourt attempted to
craft a remedy that would provide relief against past and future illegal

245. Id. at 893.
246. Id. at 915.
247. Id. at 933.

248. Id.
249. With respect to the damages portion of the ruling, distinguishing consequences
resulting from legal action from consequences resulting from illegal action was a relatively
straightforward question of proximate causation: "While the State legitimately may impose
damages for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not award compensation for the
consequences of nonviolent, protected activity." Id. at 918.
250. Id. at 924 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941)).
251. Id. at 934.
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activity without encroaching upon protected speech. 252 To the extent
that injunctive relief would still be deemed necessary, 253 the Court
ruled that "the injunction must be modified to restrain only unlawful
conduct and the persons responsible for conduct of that character." 254
The Court's decision reflected a recognition that overly broad
protections against a chilling effect could have the speech-negative
consequences of foreclosing activism, protest, and public discourse.
2. The "Buffer Zone" Cases
A similar private chill blend of legal activism and illegal
intimidation came before the Court in several cases arising from the
abortion wars. 255 In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,256 for
example, the Court considered the constitutionality of an injunction
regulating antiabortion protests targeting an abortion clinic and its
personnel. In the underlying state court action for trespass, 257 the
plaintiff-health clinic had asserted a chilling effect theory, noting that
the protestors' aggressive tactics had deterred patients from seeking
the clinic's services and that clinic personnel and their families were
being subjected to protests and harassment at their homes. 2 5 8
The Court applied an intermediate standard of scrutiny to
uphold the provisions of the injunction requiring the maintenance of
certain "buffer zones" and limited noise restrictions around the clinic,
its clients, and its personnel, although it modified the scope of the
"buffer zones" to the extent that they were deemed unnecessarily
broad. 259 In particular, the Court struck down a portion of the
injunction that prohibited the display of images observable from the
clinic and banned approaching clinic patients to attempt to dissuade
them from seeking abortion services. 260
Significantly, the line drawn by the Court was not one dictated
by the need to prevent a chilling effect. Instead, the primary concern
252. Id. at 916 (explaining that when impermissible "conduct occurs in the context of
constitutionally protected activity . . . 'precision of regulation' is demanded.").
253. The Court noted that the boycott had apparently ended, so that the question of
injunctive relief may have been moot. Id. at 924 n.67.
254. Id.
255. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 290 (4th ed.

2010) (listing cases).
256. 512 U.S. 753, 761 (1994).
257. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr, Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 667-68 (Fla. 1993).
258. 512 U.S. at 758-59.

259. Id. at 768-73.
260. Id. at 773-74.
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of the Madsen Court, as with the Claiborne Hardware Court, was to
keep the courts from exceeding the boundaries of their injunctive
power. The Court located the limit of permissible equitable power at
the line between legal and illegal private conduct. 261 Thus, the Court
was careful to fashion injunctive relief against only those activities
that existing law proscribed-such as traffic impediments, noise
violations, or illegal threats-while refusing to enjoin other activities
that contributed to the chilling effect of the protest.
For example, the Court reasoned that blocking traffic access
and creating disruptive levels of noise are actions proscribed by
statutes and common-law rules, even where such expressive conduct
constitutes protected speech.262 But approaching individuals is an
action that no statutory or common-law rule has deemed illegal,
unless the communication constitutes an actionable threat or other
proscribed speech. 263 Accordingly, the Court upheld the injunction as
to traffic-access impediments and noise limitations but invalidated the
injunction as to approaching patients. 264 The Court's remedy was not
directed to preventing a chilling effect; directly approaching a patient
entering a clinic to seek reproductive health services (which the Court
allowed) is just as, if not more, chilling than chanting via loudspeaker
(which the Court enjoined). Similarly, the Court reasoned that
"threats to patients or their families ... are proscribable under the
First Amendment." 265 But the mere display of images, however
graphic, is not illegal, and a court has no grounds to enjoin such
displays.
Like the Claiborne Hardware Court, then, the Madsen Court
stakes out a middle ground: where First Amendment activity creates a
chilling effect arising from both illegal and legal actions, the Court
should not seek to prevent all chill by enjoining all deterring actions.
Nor should it abandon the field and assume that any prospective
remedy would impermissibly encroach on First Amendment interests.
Instead, per Madsen, a court is empowered to intervene in a situation
261. See 512 U.S. at 765 n.3 ("Under general equity principles, an injunction issues only if
there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or imminently will violate, some provision of
statutory or common law, and that there is a 'cognizable danger of recurrent violation.' " (citing
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953))).
262. Id. at 769-773.
263. Id. at 774 ("Absent evidence that the protesters' speech is independently proscribable
(i.e., 'fighting words' or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a
threat of physical harm, this provision cannot stand." (citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi.,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1941))).
264. Id. at 768-74.
265. Id. at 773.
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of private chill, but the scope of its intervention follows the contours of
existing law. 2 66
The concept of the injunctive buffer zone introduced in Madsen
is a useful metaphor for the accommodation approach. Chilling effectbased reasoning would legitimate judicial intervention to prevent any
activities-legal or illegal-that could deter the exercise of protected
rights. By contrast, a buffer-zone injunction is directed to protecting a
party against the effects of illegal activity. Such a buffer zone may
extend to a limited amount of legal activity-after all, absent an
injunction, an antiabortion protester would legally be able to walk
right up to an abortion clinic without respecting a judicially created
boundary. But the court creates buffer zones not to shield a party
against a chilling effect, but to minimize the risk of illegal, irreparable
injury. Such a buffer zone, then, can burden "no more speech than
necessary to eliminate the unlawful conduct targeted by
the .

.

. injunction." 267

C. Doe v. Reed Revisited
What difference would the accommodation approach make with
respect to the difficult issues posed in the Doe v. Reed as-applied
challenge and similar disclosure challenges that are working their
way up through the federal courts?
1. The Chilling Effect Approach
Under current doctrine, the harassment-exemption standard
that governs the as-applied challenge in Doe applies if a speaker can
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of
[personal information] will subject [her] to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." 2 6 8 Of
course, any harassment exemption would be subject to some form of
substantiality threshold: few would argue that any third-party
response, however trivial, would entitle a speaker to claim the benefit
of the exemption.
Under a chilling effect framework, the severity of harassment
would be assessed according to the likelihood that such harassment
would deter a speaker from exercising her protected rights. Such an
266. See id. at 765 n.3; see also id. at 765 ("Injunctions ... are remedies imposed for
violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree.").
267. Id. at 776.

268. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
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analysis would not be required to take account of (1) whether that
harassment resulted from private action or from the state's violation
of a constitutional rule or (2) whether that harassment resulted from
legal or illegal activity. Current chilling effect doctrine, as embodied in
the harassment-exemption standard, does not assign significance to
such distinctions.
For example, from a deterrence standpoint, a consumer boycott
of a signatory's business could have as severe a deterrent effect as the
proverbial brick through the window, even though the former is legal
(and constitutionally protected) 269 and the latter constitutes illegal
vandalism. Under chilling effect-based reasoning, if the deterrent
effect were sufficiently severe, the court would grant an as-applied
exemption to prevent all such deterrent activities from happening,
whether legal or illegal. The responsive speech of activists, journalists,
and other nonparties would be considered only as part of the state's
overall interest in transparency or some other recognized state
interest.
Following the chilling effect approach in Doe, Chief Justice
Roberts framed the as-applied issue for future consideration as
"whether . . . disclosure violates the First Amendment with respect to

those who signed the R-71 petition, or other particularly controversial
petitions."270 Under this framework, if an as-applied exception was
warranted for any "particularly controversial" petition, any signatory
would be entitled to such an exemption, whether or not the signatory
belonged to a group particularly susceptible to harassment. For
example, a future disclosure challenge might involve contributors to a
"particularly controversial" petition. Under the Doe standard, so long
as a well-founded fear of "threats, harassment, or reprisals" chilled
any contributor, all contributors could avail themselves of the
harassment exemption. Moreover, chilling effect logic offers no reason
to distinguish between a severe chilling effect resulting from legal
means of reprisal (such as a consumer boycott or harsh public
criticism) and a severe chilling effect resulting from illegal means of
reprisal (such as threats or vandalism).

269. See supranote 238.
270. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820-21 (2010). This framing in terms of the controversial nature of the
petition at issue suggests a potentially significant expansion of the scope of the harassment
exemption, which had previously only been applied with respect to minor political parties or
other protected associations.
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2. The Accommodation Approach
An accommodation framework, by contrast, would be more
targeted. It would first ask whether the source of the chilling effect
was a constitutional rule violation by the state. Assuming that the
Court once again ruled that the Public Records Act violated no
constitutional norm, the inquiry under the Doe facts would then turn
to whether the private actions giving rise to the chilling effect were
themselves legal or illegal. If the private actions are themselves legal,
then the court has no clear mandate to intervene to prevent such
activities, even if those actions deter protected expression.
But if the private actions are illegal, then the court has a
mandate to craft a remedy to prevent such actions. In addition to
merely enjoining action that is already illegal, the court may need to
create a buffer zone that extends to some legal activity. But such a
buffer zone should "burden no more speech than necessary to
eliminate the unlawful conduct."27 1 Moreover, the remedy should
satisfy traditional requirements for equitable intervention-in other
words, that irreparable injury will result absent the court's
intervention and that existing legal remedies are inadequate to
protect the speaker.
For instance, if the signatories were able to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of physical violence, the court might decide that, under
the circumstances, it is necessary to redact the identifying information
of individual signatories. 272 But such an exemption would not
automatically apply to all participants in the ballot initiative. If the
basis for the exemption was the threat of physical injury, such an
exemption would not necessarily extend to shield a corporation that
had contributed to the ballot-initiative campaign. The accommodation
approach thus allows for a more flexible and tailored remedy than a
chilling effect approach.
I do not claim that the accommodation approach "solves" Doe v.
Reed or any of the difficult policy and constitutional questions
surrounding the issue of disclosure. Instead, I offer the equitable
accommodation approach as a starting point for analysis. Viewing a
private chill claim as an accommodation claim rather than a First
Amendment chilling effect claim may assist a court both in

271. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776.
272. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (Freedom of Information Act provision allowing for
redaction of private information).
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understanding the interests at stake and in tailoring an appropriate
remedy.
D. Toward a Taxonomy of Chilling Effects
Based on the previous discussion of Doe v. Reed and other
private chill cases, we can start to construct a partial taxonomy of
chilling effect claims. The first step in this framework is an inquiry
into the challenged governmental action at issue: Is what deters
speakers from exercising their protected rights the consequence of the
government's violation of constitutional norms?
Governmental Chill: Where the source of chill is a
governmental rule violation, whether inadvertent or invidious, the
dispute is properly framed as a right against the state. Procedurally, a
speaker might claim that a procedural defect such as vagueness or
overbreadth imposes unwarranted uncertainty costs on the exercise of
First Amendment rights. Substantively, a speaker might claim that
the indirect consequence of a given regulation imposes an
unjustifiable constitutional burden in the form of deterrence. With
respect to invidious discrimination, a speaker might claim that an
otherwise supportable and neutral law creates a constitutional burden
as a result of state animus. Both negative-rights and positive-rights
accounts of the First Amendment provide a clear mandate for court
intervention to prevent such governmental chill.
Private Chill: Where there is no governmental rule violation,
and the source of chill is private action, the courts' role changes, as
does the focus of its inquiry. Rather than conceiving of the dispute as a
positive-rights or negative-rights claim against the state, the court
should treat the dispute as more akin to a private law dispute among
private parties, both of which have constitutional interests at stake.
In such a private chill dispute, the distinction between legal
and illegal sources of chill becomes paramount. Where the source of
chill is illegal private activity, it is within the court's equitable
authority to take action to prevent such illegal action from occurring.
This task will necessarily involve courts in fact-intensive inquiries to
determine what remedy would best target illegal sources of chill while
minimizing any encroachment on legal activity. This process will also
be informed by traditional equitable principles-for example, that
equitable relief is appropriate only where there is no adequate remedy
at law.
But if the source of chill is legal private activity, a court should
be reluctant to enjoin or otherwise prevent that conduct. There are
certainly scenarios where the grant of such relief might seem

1538

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:5:1473

intuitively desirable: the range of legally permissible chilling behavior
includes much private retaliation that we find repellent, such as hate
mail, private employment discrimination, 2 7 3 and communications that
push the boundaries of actionable harassment. But as explained
above, if directed against legal conduct, such relief would be the
equivalent of allowing a judge to forbid otherwise legal-or even
constitutionally protected-activity that no source of law had
previously deemed impermissible. Neither a negative-rights nor a
positive-rights account of the First Amendment warrants a court's
intervention in such situations. Instead, the scope of legally
permissible private reaction is ordinarily a question more suited to
legislative, rather than judicial, resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a new and salient distinction in chilling
effect analysis. This distinction focuses on the underlying source of the
chilling effect. The inquiry I proprose would first determine whether
the gravamen of a particular dispute is a constitutional rule violation
by the state, or whether it primarily involves a conflict of interests
between two private parties. Each of these possibilities, in turn,
generates its own normative consequences and doctrinal framework,
as I have argued at length.
It may seem excessive to have developed such a framework to
deal with a subset of cases-private chill cases-that thus far have
arisen only in the context of mandatory disclosure laws. Moreover, in
practical terms, the result of the application of the equitable
accommodation approach in Doe v. Reed and other disclosure cases
does not differ radically from the result reached under existing
doctrine. The private chill framework, then, might seem to be a
solution awaiting a problem.
But the category of private chill seems destined for rapid
expansion. Potential private chill issues arise wherever a
governmental action in some way enables a private reaction to speech.
In various First Amendment spheres, chains of consequences are
lengthening, resulting in an increased potential for chilling effects. 274
Given the likelihood that the problem of private action will arise with

273. See supratext accompanying note 176 (noting that such private employment retaliation
is already illegal in many jurisdictions, including Washington state).
274. See supra text accompanying note 11 (describing the effect of new technologies and the
broader reach of private chill cases).

2013]

THE CHILLING EFFECT & PRIVATE ACTION

1539

increasing frequency and urgency, this Article offers a starting point
for both scholarly and judicial analysis.
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